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Abstract 
 
 
This dissertation samples three episodes from nineteenth century United States 
history that conveniently illustrate economic behavior in the arena of banking and 
finance. 
 The first chapter considers improvements in cross-market arbitrage due to 
technological change.  The completion of the undersea Atlantic telegraph cable in July 
1866 more closely integrated securities markets on two continents.  Chapter 1 conducts 
an event study on one security with a dual listing on the New York and London Stock 
Exchanges using daily data.  The event study provides some evidence that the 
information lag between the two markets shortened from ten days to zero days.  We can 
recover transatlantic steamship crossing times from securities prices. 
 The second chapter investigates bank window dressing.  Window dressing is a 
temporary change in portfolio designed to produce a more appealing report to regulators 
or to the public.  Market observers accused national banks of window dressing after the 
Civil War.  Chapter 2 attempts to determine whether or not postbellum Philadelphia 
banks window dressed their balance sheets.  A test finds some evidence for window 
dressing. 
 The third chapter conducts an econometric test of Diamond and Dybvig's (1983) 
theory of bank runs as interpreted by Calomiris and Gorton (1991).  Diamond and 
Dybvig employ an exogenous liquidity shock to depositors in order to develop a theory of 
bank runs.  Calomiris and Gorton interpret the exogenous liquidity shock as a seasonal 
withdrawal from the nation's agricultural interior.  Chapter 3 reexamines the hypothesis 
 v
that a seasonal interior reserve drain served as the exogenous liquidity shock before the 
bank panics of 1873 and 1893 in the United States.  Using individual bank level data in 
New York, this paper tests whether the banks that held most of the deposits from the 
interior, the "interest-paying" banks, experience reserve drains just before the panic.  The 
evidence reveals that a seasonal interior drain could have triggered the 1873 panic, but 
that Diamond and Dybvig's model cannot be applied to the bank panic of 1893 without a 
non-seasonal interpretation of the exogenous liquidity shock. 
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Introduction 
 
 Economic history employs historical data to test economic theory.  History 
provides a useful vantage point for economic analysis.  Economic history permits 
observation of economic agents in different regulatory and institutional environments.   
As a consequence, historical events produce a rich series of natural experiments.  This 
dissertation samples three such episodes from the nineteenth century United States that 
conveniently illustrate economic behavior in the arena of banking and finance. 
The first episode, Chapter 1, considers the behavior of markets when subject to an 
exogenous change in the structure of informational flows.  In 1866, engineers constructed 
an undersea telegraph cable across the Atlantic Ocean.  The telegraphic connection 
allowed immediate access to transcontinental information without a long ocean voyage.  
One immediate application of faster information transmission is to transcontinental 
arbitrage across securities markets. 
The first chapter considers market efficiency.  Did market participants take 
advantage of the new information present in the market?  Did the introduction of the 
telegraph allow for closer pricing of securities on the two markets?  From the point of 
finance theory, we expect investors to arbitrage away price differentials.  Markets should 
become more closely integrated when more precise information is available.  This 
chapter inquires about these issues by comparing daily security pricing of a dual-listed 
security on the New York and London Stock Exchanges before and after the introduction 
of the Atlantic telegraph.    
 The advantage of the historical episode is that we have multiple price transactions 
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while information travels between markets.  In modern markets, marginal improvements 
in the speed of information transmission often exceed the rate price quotation.  In this 
case, the introduction of the telegraph decreased the information lag by vessel travel time 
across the Atlantic (about ten to fourteen days), while stock markets quote daily prices on 
securities during this period.  So, we can observe information as it travels from one 
market to another.  In fact, markets priced the securities so well that we can recover 
transatlantic crossing time from securities quotations. 
The second episode, Chapter 2, investigates bank window dressing.  Window 
dressing is a temporary change in portfolio designed to produce a more appealing report 
to regulators or to the public.  Window dressing obscures the health of individual banks 
by systematically altering underlying balance sheets.  Bank regulators show concern 
about window dressing because mismeasured data will bias tests and may lead to policy 
errors.  In order to learn more about window dressing, we turn to an historical example. 
Just after the American Civil War, market observers accused national banks of 
window dressing their balance sheets.  The National Bank Act of 1864 required national 
banks to submit reports of condition on the first Monday of each quarter.  Because banks 
knew about the quarterly reporting day in advance, they had an incentive to acquire extra 
reserves around the reporting date in order to appear as if they regularly held a more 
conservative portfolio.  Prominent bank regulators argued that window dressing by banks 
produced systematic quarterly stringencies in national money markets. 
 The historical example permits the investigation of window dressing, which is 
normally difficult to detect.  A direct test of window dressing requires two distinct 
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simultaneous observations on bank reserves.  Often, the only available measurement of 
bank reserves is provided to a bank regulator.  Due to a fortunate historical coincidence, 
postbellum Philadelphia retains two reported series of reserves on roughly the same set of 
banks.  We can perform a direct test for bank window dressing by comparing these two 
series and evaluating their consistency with each other. 
The third episode, Chapter 3, examines how bank crises begin.  Bank panics were 
a regular occurrence in the nineteenth century in the United States, so history is a 
convenient opportunity to study bank runs.  During this period, banks in the agricultural 
West and Midwest deposited reserves in money centers such as New York.  Sprague 
(1910) describes how a certain class of banks, called "interest-paying" banks, specialized 
in accepting these deposits and held most of the balances.  Deposits from the interior 
suffered regular seasonal fluctuations as agrarian bankers withdrew their funds in order to 
meet seasonal agricultural requirements.  During periods of seasonal stress, such as the 
autumn harvest, large amounts of these deposits were recalled to the agricultural interior.  
Occasionally, these episodes endangered the solvency of "interest-paying" banks and 
ended in bank crises.  The leadership of the New York Clearing House Association, an 
important financial institution during the period, recognized the vulnerability of the 
interest-paying banks and attempted to regulate the payment of interest on demand 
deposits many times. 
 The third chapter tests a theory of bank crises using the historical example of 
seasonal withdrawals.  Diamond and Dybvig (1983) employ an exogenous liquidity 
shock to depositors in order to develop a theory of bank runs.  Calomiris and Gorton 
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(1991) interpret the exogenous liquidity shock as a seasonal withdrawal from the nation's 
agricultural interior.  Calomiris and Gorton evaluate the seasonal hypothesis, but these 
authors do not provide any statistical evidence for their claims.  This chapter performs an 
econometric evaluation of Calomiris and Gorton's thesis by looking for seasonal 
withdrawals on interest-paying banks just before panics struck the New York money 
market.  According to the interpretation of the theory, interest-paying banks should suffer 
a large exogenous shock as a bank run begins.  We can test whether or not seasonal 
withdrawals on interest-paying banks accompanied the onset of financial crises. 
With the addition of primary data collection, the method of inquiry is standard to 
applied economics.  Economic historians turn to archives to provide information about 
past economic events.  Once the data have been gathered, econometric tools verify 
whether or not observed behavior conforms to the predictions of economic theory.  
Economic historians use the same approach and methods as modern applied economists: 
we identify a test of the theory, gather the appropriate data, and conduct an econometric 
evaluation.  The only difference is that historical data is a just little dustier than modern 
data. 
 We earn two lessons from the exercise.  The first lesson reminds us that the 
theory, however elegant, may or may not accurately represent the real world, and so the 
theory must be tested.  The assumptions about the environment, the description of 
interaction among agents, and the model of how the agents behave may all conspire 
against the application of the theory.  The second lesson is that viewing theory through 
history is a useful device.  On certain occasions, historical events align to provide 
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potential economic insight.  Here we collect three such episodes for the use and the 
enjoyment of the profession. 
  
6
 
“Lombard Street and Wall Street talked with each other as two neighbors across the 
way.” 
 
Henry M. Field, quoted in Friedman and Schwartz ([1963], p. 26). 
 
 
 
 Chapter 1 
 
The Atlantic Telegraph Company completed an undersea telegraph cable across 
the Atlantic Ocean in 1866.  Prior to the telegraphic connection a minimum eight day 
voyage by steamship linked the capital markets of the United States and Europe.  
Thereafter information flowed across the Atlantic at the speed of an electrical impulse. 
 Chapter 1 considers the change in capital market information flows due to the 
exogenous technological advance of the telegraph.  The introduction of the Atlantic 
Cable offers an excellent opportunity to investigate a change in the structure of 
information.  Modern marginal increases in the speed of information transmission are 
small relative to the rate of price quotation.  Instead, the telegraph shortened information 
transmission time by the length of an ocean voyage across the Atlantic, about ten to 
fourteen days.  Since securities markets quote daily prices during this period, we can 
obtain multiple price observations between information shocks.  Thus, we can observe 
information originating in one market arriving in another. 
Did the Atlantic Cable increase market efficiency?   Semi-strong efficient markets 
use all past public information to set current equilibrium prices.  One component of 
public information is the price history on another market.  Prices in highly integrated 
markets should converge to prevent arbitrage opportunities.  If financial markets took 
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advantage of new information and transactions costs were sufficiently low, then prices set 
after the introduction of the telegraph should reflect one-day-old information by telegraph 
instead of at least eight-day-old information by steamship. 
Chapter 1 employs an event study in order to recover a change in the 
informational structure from stock prices.  The event study examines how long price 
differentials between New York and London persist after large price changes in New 
York.  The event study provides evidence from securities prices that the telegraph 
decreased the information lag from ten days to zero days.  That is, we can recover 
transatlantic steamship crossing times from securities prices. 
 
Introduction 
 
Did market participants take advantage of technological advances?  Previous 
work demonstrates that the introduction of the telegraph coincided with price 
convergence between the New York and London Stock Exchanges.  Garbade and Silber 
(1978) attribute an increase in price convergence to the introduction of the Atlantic Cable 
on July 27, 1866.  The authors analyze the performance of US 5-20 1862 federal bonds 
using daily data from April–July 1866 and October–November of 1867, 1868, and 1871.  
They find a difference between the mean absolute deviations of the pre- and post-
telegraph periods of about 2.7 gold dollars (significant at the 0.01% level) or about 7% of 
the value of the stock.  
The authors' analysis is biased toward finding market integration.  Garbade and 
Silber (1978) base their pre-telegraph estimate of price divergence on three months of 
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data.  Unfortunately, these months bracket the May 1866 Overend, Guerney and Co. 
banking crisis in London.  This severe shock to the London market caused high price 
differentials between the two markets when asset prices in London fell.  The high price 
differential during the crisis overstates the lack of integration before the introduction of 
the telegraph. 
In another study, Michie (1987) claims that the telegraph increased market 
integration between New York and London.  Michie (1987, p. 46–7) compares the 
performance of two railroad stocks in 1860 to a government bond in 1870.  He observes a 
decrease in the price differential between the two markets and an increase in intraday 
price spread overlap. 
Michie's test is also biased toward finding more integration. Neal (1992a, b) 
describes 1860 as a "worst case" [Neal (1992b, p. 12)] year for examining market 
integration.  The election of Abraham Lincoln precipitated a small stock market panic 
when Southerners withdrew funds from Northern banks, again creating large price 
differentials between the two markets.  Further, the comparison of two volatile stocks to a 
bond may generate price convergence independent of telegraphic information flows. 
Both studies use only the timing of the change in regime to make the causal 
inference.  Many other events during the period can explain observed price convergence 
since the introduction of the Atlantic Cable occurs nearly simultaneously with other 
major shocks.  In addition to the Overend, Guerney crisis, the introduction of the 
telegraph coincides with a decrease in market uncertainty following the American Civil 
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War.  While previous work is very suggestive that the telegraph caused price 
convergence, perhaps we can obtain more conclusive evidence. 
The direction of cross-market information flows is also of interest.  Garbade and 
Silber (1979) framed the question of whether or not a satellite foreign market exerts an 
influence on a dominant home market.  Not only did information about fundamentals and 
speculative behavior originating in New York affect the London price, but events on the 
Continent could affect the New York price.  Information about wars between European 
powers, the impending arrival of gold or securities shipped from the Continent, and the 
British reaction to American political events signaled foreign demand for U.S. securities.  
Studies of modern cross-listed firms (such as Hauser, Tanchuma, and Yaari [1998], Lau 
and Diltz [1994], and Lieberman, Ben-Zion, and Hauser [1999]) conclude that often the 
home market dominates, but that sometimes price effects can be detected in the other 
direction.  This chapter confirms the result that information flows from the home market 
to the foreign market.  Reversing the event study shows that most information flowed 
from New York to London only.  There does not appear to be any significant influence of 
the London price series on the New York price. 
Price convergence of a liquid dual listed security may be an important precursor 
of full market integration.  Papers by Eun and Shim (1989) and Lin, Engle, and Ito (1994) 
detect cross-market information flows with market indices.  In general, historical 
financial markets have shown a high degree of integration when compared to their 
modern counterparts.  Using data on the full market, Chabot (2000) argues that the New 
York and London securities markets may have been highly integrated between 1866-
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1885.  Neal (1990) presents evidence that cross-listed share prices during the 17th and 
18th centuries were remarkably well integrated. 
 
Data 
In order to investigate the decrease in the information lag, I consider a single 
security listed on both the New York and London Stock Exchanges.  Securities with a 
dual listing are susceptible to arbitrage operations.  Paper assets are preferred to 
commodity assets because bulky items suffered sizable shipping costs. 
This study examines the $100 common shares of the New York and Erie Railroad.  
Erie was one of the few dual listed securities that had a consistent series of observations 
both before and after the introduction of the Atlantic Cable on both sides of the Atlantic.  
According to an 1865 estimate, 60% of Erie common shares were in foreign, primarily 
English, hands (New York Times, October 28, 1865).  Erie also had enough significant 
price jumps to make an event study feasible.  Contemporary observers considered Erie 
common shares, the "Scarlet Woman of Wall Street," one of the most volatile securities 
on the New York market.  Speculators (including the "Speculative Director" and 
longtime treasurer of the company, Daniel Drew) subjected Erie to a series of pools, 
raids, and corners during the period [Adams, Jr. and Adams, (1956)].  The end of the data 
set witnesses the first chapter of the infamous Erie War, including a hostile takeover 
attempt by Cornelius Vanderbilt. 
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Two newspapers, the New York Times and the London Times, contain 
observations on Erie common shares from August 1864 to July 1868.  The New York 
Times prints daily sales of shares on the New York Stock Exchange between 10 to 12 
AM.  The London Times prints both a list of sales for the day and a range of closing 
prices.  We use the average of the closing price spread because data on trades in London 
became thin toward the extremes of the data set.  Also, London closing prices have the 
advantage of trading roughly simultaneously with the New York market.  During this 
period, the London market during this period closed at 4 PM, which was 11 AM New 
York time [Michie, (1987, p. 73)]. 
Comparing prices on the two markets requires a currency conversion.  First, we 
convert U.S. paper dollars ("greenbacks") to U.S. gold dollars.  Gold dollars were then 
converted to pounds at the rate of a 60-day bill of exchange discounted by the London 
interest rate.  Pounds were then converted back to dollars at a customary par exchange.  
Finally, we adjust the London price for forward trading as most trades were made for a 
fortnightly settlement day.  Schmidt (1875) employs a simpler version of this procedure 
in his directive for arbitrageurs.  Appendix 1A contains additional information about the 
data set and the conversion procedure. 
 
Design 
As previous research has shown, price convergence occurs near the time when the 
telegraph was introduced.  Figure 1.1 shows the daily price differential between the 
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converted New York price and the London price for Erie shares.  A visible decrease in 
the price differential occurs shortly after the introduction of the telegraph on July 27, 
1866, denoted by the center black line.  The price differential in London drops from an 
average of 5% before the telegraph to about 2% afterwards.  In fact, the difference in the 
mean absolute deviation between the two periods was 1.61 (= 2.34  - 0.725) in London, 
slightly less than 5% of the value of the security.  Under an independence assumption, the 
difference is significant at better than the 1% level (t = 18.68).  This result replicates 
those of Garbade and Silber (1978) and Michie (1987). 
However, we expect to find an increase in price convergence because domestic 
market volatility decreased over the period.  Both the Erie price and the gold premium are 
less volatile after the introduction of the telegraph.  F tests of the ratio of the variance of 
the absolute price differential before the cable to the variance of the absolute price 
differential after the cable for both Erie shares in New York and the premium on the price 
of gold in greenback dollars were significant at better than the 1% level (Erie F = 3.57, 
gold F = 91.23).  While Erie has only a slight decrease in the magnitude of the first 
difference, the gold price becomes much less volatile by the end of 1865. 
The change in underlying volatility weakens the statement that the telegraph 
caused price convergence.  Because of the changes in the volatility of Erie and the price 
of gold before the cable was introduced, we already expect to find convergence.  An 
exogenous decrease in the variance of the security will lead to a smaller mean absolute 
deviation between the prices of the two markets.  A simple before and after test may 
misattribute causation to the telegraph.  Large market shocks that strike before the 
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introduction of the telegraph (such as the Overend-Guerney crisis) will appear to generate 
price convergence even if the telegraph had never existed.  The event study strengthens 
the inference about the telegraph's causal effect by demonstrating the change in the 
structure of information. 
Historical facts complicate detecting a decrease in the information lag. 
Information flows between the two markets were distributed stochastically over lags of 
several different lengths.  Before the telegraphic connection information transfer was 
limited to ships that carried mail over the Atlantic.  The speed of the information 
transmission depended on the speed of the steamship, which could vary due to the 
vessel’s design or the weather.  Further, seasonal variation in shipping demand also 
affects the frequency of information transmission.  Vessels carrying new information 
neither left nor arrived every day.  Finally, technological advances in recording and 
transmitting messages caused telegraphic response times to decline over the period.  
Delays and outages occasionally occurred when cables broke. 
Event studies often rely on a regular series of known events such as dividend 
announcements.  Erie suspended paying dividends in 1866.1  Instead, we allow a 
sufficiently large price change in the converted New York price to indicate the presence 
of new information in the domestic market.  Perhaps sufficiently large price changes 
indicate a change in the underlying fundamentals.  We use the converted price because it 
includes new information based on the share price, the gold price, and the exchange rate.  
                                                 
1.  A popular comment declared "The three certainties in life are death, taxes, and no dividends on Erie 
common."  
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Define an event day as a change greater than 2.35 percent of par in the converted price of 
Erie.  The threshold 2.35 was chosen to yield approximately 50 events.  Small changes in 
the event threshold do not alter the results. 
 The event study makes information more detectable in the presence of transaction 
costs.   In a study of modern cross-listing, Neumark, Tinsley, and Tosini (1991) suggest 
that price reactions must exceed a threshold transaction cost in order to register on 
another market.  Transactions costs by cable were formidable: telegraphing 20 words 
including name, address, and signature from New York to London cost 21 pounds 
sterling (about $100) until November 1, 1866 when the price fell by half.  Partially 
offsetting the cost of transmission, the press in both countries reported the prices of 
prominent securities (including Erie) traded on the other market.  Instead of attempting to 
directly estimate transactions costs, the event study helps to overcome transaction cost 
barriers by conditioning on a subset of the most volatile events.  Large price changes in 
one market, presumably indicating a change in fundamentals, would be the most visible 
to another market and the most likely to be arbitraged. 
 Arbitrageurs employed several strategies.  Prior to the introduction of the 
telegraph, arbitrage mostly consisted of being the first investor to trade based on new 
information from the other market.  Suppose new information increased the New York 
price.  Armed with the new information, an arbitrageur would travel by steamship to 
London.  On arrival, the arbitrageur would quickly buy the security.  The arbitrageur 
would then sell back to the market later at a higher price after the London market had 
digested the news.  Once communication by telegraph was possible, more elaborate 
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schemes were available. 2  Again, suppose new information increased the price in New 
York.  In one common tactic, "selling to arrive," a New York investor sold shares 
forward ten or fifteen days, usually with the option to deliver at a time of the seller's 
choice.   The investor cabled a confederate in London with orders to purchase shares on 
the London exchange and send them by steamship to New York.  If multiple trades did 
not offset the partners' accounts, remissions could be made by steamship or by cable.  
Note that speculating in shares was not exactly a theoretical textbook case of arbitrage.  
Speculators accepted small risks of garbled messages or large price changes during the 
brief interval that telegraphic orders traveled. 
 
Test 
 
We conduct an event study to detect a change in the structure of information.  The 
event study measures how long a price differential persists between the two markets as a 
result of a large price change in New York.  Suppose the converted price of Erie in New 
York reacts to new information.  The change in the converted price might occur through 
alterations in the gold price, the exchange rate, or the stock price.  Before the telegraph, 
the London market’s ignorance of the new information will create a price differential 
between New York and London.  The price differential should persist for the time it takes 
for new information to travel across the Atlantic.  After the introduction of the cable, the 
                                                 
2.  Actually, arbitrageurs used the same strategy after the telegraph was in place.  Detectives exposed a ring 
of telegraph operators who smuggled Associated Press financial reports to prominent Wall Street contac ts 
prior to publication (Philadelphia Inquirer, July 3, 1867).  Wall Street brokers were thus able to trade based 
on the telegraphic information before it became public through the press. 
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price differential created by a converted price change in New York should disappear 
within a few days. 
Consider a formalization of the event study.  Recall that an event day was defined 
as a change in the converted New York price of greater than 2.35 percent of par.  Number 
each event day i before the telegraph from 1 to N and each event day j after the telegraph 
from 1 to M.  Each event is a 19-day sequence of price differentials beginning on the 
event day and ending eighteen days after an event day.  Number each day in event time t 
from 0 to 18 relative to the event day at time t = 0.  Denote the New York price converted 
by the foreign exchange conversion described in Appendix 1A by NYitp .  Denote the 
London price of event i at time t by Litp . 
Now construct the series of price differentials.  We want to extract price 
differentials between the two markets resulting from an event in New York.  While the 
absolute price differential Lit
NY
it pp -  is a viable candidate, it requires standardization 
because the two markets do not always have exactly the same prices.  Suppose that the 
two markets already price the security differently before the event began.  When an event 
occurs, we cannot attribute all of the price difference between the two markets to the 
occurrence of the event.  So, we standardize the price differential by subtracting out the 
price differential of the day before the event day.  If no price exists for the day before 
event day, we use the price difference of one of the three days prior to the event day, in 
order, and we disallow the event if no price differential can be found within three days.  
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Hence, denote the standardized absolute price difference between the converted price in 
New York and the London price during event i at event time t before the telegraph by 
cit = | NYitp – 
L
itp  – (
NY
ip 1,-  – 
L
ip 1,- )|     (1.1) 
 
and the standardized absolute price difference on event j at event time t after the 
telegraph by 
djt = | NYitp – 
L
itp  – (
NY
ip 1,-  – 
L
ip 1,- )| .     (1.2) 
 
We now have N slices of price differentials of length 19 from before the introduction of 
the telegraph and M slices of price differentials of length 19 from afterward. 
Event studies standardize the returns during an event period by the mean of the 
returns from a pre-estimation period.   Deviations from a zero mean will inflate the test 
statistics (Brown and Warner [1985]).  Therefore, price differentials for both the before 
and after regimes are standardized by their respective means.  Let c  (respectively d ) be 
the mean of the standardized absolute price differentials before (respectively after) the 
telegraph that did not fall into an event period.  Let 
xit = | NYitp – 
L
itp  – (
NY
ip 1,-  – 
L
ip 1,- )| - c   and     (1.3a) 
yjt = | NYitp – 
L
itp  – (
NY
ip 1,-  – 
L
ip 1,- )| - d       (1.3b) 
 
be the mean-adjusted standardized same day price differentials for the periods before and 
after the introduction of the telegraph, respectively.  Event studies typically estimate the 
means c  and d  from a pre-estimation period.  Instead of using a pre-estimation period, 
we estimate these two quantities with the population means of the entire sample. 
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Consider the distribution of the standardized price differentials.  Suppose that 
before the Atlantic Cable 
E(xit) = mt and Var (xit) = 2ts ,
      (1.4) 
 
 while after the introduction of the telegraph 
 
E(yjt) = nt and Var (nt) =  2tt ,
      (1.5) 
 
where mt and nt are the cross-section population means while 2ts and 
2
tt are the population 
variances.  Hence, for both regimes and for a given event time t, both the mean-adjusted 
standardized price differentials and their respective variances are constant across events. 
Form cross-sectional averages for each t.  Fix a time lag t after an event and 
define the cross-sectional averages over the events by 
tx  = (1/Nt) å
=
tN
i 1
itx   and  ty  = (1/Mt) å
=
tM
j 1
jty ,  (1.6) 
 
where Nt and Mt are the number of observations of xit and yjt respectively.  The number 
of points Nt or Mt in the cross-sectional average can vary due to the number of prices that 
did not exist when one market or the other was closed.  For large enough samples, the 
central limit theorem yields 
tx  ~ N(mt, 2ts /Nt)  and ty  ~ N(nt, 
2
tt /Mt),   (1.7) 
 
if xit and yjt are independent for a fixed t.  Observe that values of xit and yjt may be 
independent across i and j if events are spaced sufficiently far apart in time even if the 
daily time series is correlated.3 
                                                 
3.  An alternate method allows the conditional variance to be transmitted across markets.  Future research 
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Now derive a test statistic for each event time t.  For each t, let the null hypothesis 
be that the standardized mean price differential is the same before and after the telegraph: 
Ho: mt = nt.  Base a test statistic on 
zt  = ( tx  - ty )/ ))M/( + )N/ t2t2(( tt ts .     (1.8) 
 
Under the null hypothesis, zt is asymptotically normally distributed.  The actual 
distribution solves the Behrens-Fisher problem of drawing from two distributions with 
unequal variances.  In practice, statisticians employ a t distribution as a rough 
approximation. 
Let v be the travel time across the Atlantic Ocean for information-bearing vessels. 
The minimum travel time from Boston to Liverpool was 8 days 5 hours.4  Since not every 
ship made the journey across the Atlantic that quickly, v is probably between eight to 
fourteen days.  Most vessels required between ten to fourteen days. 
Let c be the time it takes to transmit information by cable.  There was only a one-
hour overlap when both the London and New York markets were open together (Michie 
[1987], p. 73), so we expect c to be between zero to two days.  It seems unlikely that c 
would be larger than one, although Sundays, holidays, and cable outages could delay the 
receipt of news.  After the connection, information ought to be transmitted across the 
Atlantic with perhaps a lag of c days as opposed to a lag of v days. 
The cross-sectional averages tx  and ty  reflect the change in the structure of 
information flows.  Before the introduction of the telegraph, the cross-sectional averages 
                                                                                                                                                 
should investigate this possibility. 
4.  For more information about transatlantic crossing times, see http://www.blueriband.com. 
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tx  should reflect information transmission time of v, vessel travel time.  News 
originating in New York should take v days to reach London.  Suppose that an event 
occurs in New York.  The New York price will react to this information while the 
London market remains ignorant.  Hence, for times t < v, we should observe a significant 
difference between the New York price and the London price, so tx  will be significantly 
positive.  For information lags longer than v, the London market finds out about the New 
York event.  So for t ³ v we expect the cross-sectional averages tx  to be insignificantly 
different from zero.  After the telegraph, the cross-sectional averages ty  reflect 
information arrived by cable.  For times t < c after an event, again a significant price 
difference should exist as the New York market knows something that the London 
market does not.  Hence, ty  is positive.  For event times t ³ c, the information has 
traveled and there should be no difference.  For t ³ c ty  should be insignificant different 
from zero. 
Test 1 subtracts the cross-sectional averages in order to obtain the distribution of 
zt.  Test 1 uses the t statistics to check whether or not the informational structure changed.  
For event times t < c we should observe no difference between the mean deviation before 
the cable and the mean deviation after the cable.  No information has been transmitted 
yet.  For event times t Î [c,v) in the post-telegraph period London could have received 
price information about the event by telegraph, whereas for event times t Î [c,v) in the 
pre-telegraph period price information has not yet arrived.  Thus, for t Î [c,v) a price 
differential will exist in the pre-telegraph London market while a price differential will 
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not exist in the post-telegraph London market.  This price differential will persist until 
news arrives by ship in London (until t ³ v).  Hence, under the hypothesis that the 
telegraph caused the entire price difference, for each event time t Î [c,v) the difference 
between the mean absolute price difference before the cable and the mean absolute price 
difference after the cable should be statistically significant. 
The event study's estimate of v is probably underestimates the average duration of 
vessel travel time.  Recall that information flows are distributed stochastically around v 
due to fluctuations in maritime conditions.  The t statistics for shorter information lags 
close to v are more likely to be significant than longer ones.  Both fast and slow 
information-bearing vessels contribute to earlier zt but only slow vessels contribute 
significantly to later zt.  Hence, later lengths of lag are less likely to be significant. 
Standard event studies estimate an appropriate variance of the test statistics by 
using data from a pre-estimation period.  This procedure requires that the variance does 
not change during the event window.  Instead, we must allow the variance to differ 
during the event window.  Following the example of earlier studies, Brown and Warner 
([1985] p. 24) suggest consider alternate variance estimates.  This event study estimates 
the variances of the test statistics by directly calculating the variance of the cross-
sectional statistics.  That is, we estimate Var( tx ) and Var( ty ) from the existing sample 
realizations of xit and yjt used to calculate tx  and ty .  These statistics are more 
conservative than simply using the variances estimated from the entire series. 
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Clustering impedes event study methodology.  In standard event studies described 
by Brown and Warner, clustering is the simultaneous occurrence of events across 
securities.  In our case, clustering takes the form of one event occurring within the event 
window of another event.  Event clustering is an important possibility in our data because 
the events are defined endogenously by large price changes.  Clustering invalidates 
independence across test statistics and may also cause the tests to have incorrect size 
(Brown and Warner, Table 8, p. 21). 
A quick estimate of the bias to the coefficients due to clustering examines the zt 
statistics for large t.  Under both the null and the alternative, for large t the zt statistics 
should be zero.  For t greater than vessel travel time, information has traveled both by 
steamship and by telegraph.  Mean-adjusted price differentials before and after the 
introduction of the telegraph should be approximately the same.  Hence, we can use the t 
statistics for large t as the true mean of the zt under the null hypothesis with event 
clustering.  Bernard (1987) discusses other remedies. 
 We can also run the test in the reverse direction.  We can use the same test to 
determine whether or not the London market transmitted news to New York.  The test 
statistics of the event study remain the same, and only the definition of the event changes.  
We would like to define a London event as large price change in the converted price of 
the London security as it appears in New York.  Unfortunately, daily historical dollar-
sterling exchange rates are not available in London.  The lack of data limits the event 
study to defining an event in London as a large change in the actual London price of the 
security.  This method omits information revealed by the adjustment of the foreign 
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exchange rate.  The omission decreases the power of the test, as we are less likely to 
identify news in London that could affect the price in New York. 
 
Results 
The data generated a distribution of events.  Recall that we define an event as a 
change in the converted New York price of Erie of greater than 2.35 percent of par.  This 
definition yields 49 events.  Of these, 29 events fell before and 20 events fell after the 
introduction of the Atlantic Cable.  The theory requires a sufficiently calm market 
between events.  Events must not overlap or else new information may obscure the 
arrival of previous information.  Unfortunately, the events clustered together.  Of the 49 
events, 34 fell within a week of some other event.  For example, five events fell during 
the seven trading days April 4–11, 1865, when the American Civil War drew to a close.  
Overlapping events obscure the time lag of the market reaction.  Also, clustering may 
invalidate the assumption of cross-sectional independence. 
Table 1.1 displays the results of Test 1, the absolute value event study.  Table 1.1 
contains a list of t statistics on the variable zt, one for each time t after an event.  The t 
statistics examine the difference between the mean-adjusted absolute deviations before 
and after the telegraph for a given length lag t after an event.  Each t statistic has 
approximately between 20 and 44 degrees of freedom. 
The event study detects the London market reacting to price changes in the New 
York market.  Table 1.1 presents evidence that vessel travel time, v, was at least nine 
days and perhaps ten.  Table 1.1 shows positively significant differences at the 5% level 
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(two-tailed test) for event times t = 0 through 9, although t = 4, 9, and 12 are marginally 
significant.  Since we observe significant zt statistics for about eight or nine days, this 
result supports the hypothesis that the telegraph shortened the information lag by about 
nine or ten days.  Because zt for event time zero was significant, cable transmission time, 
c, seems to be only zero days.  Information travel on the same day seems fast.  Since the 
prices are roughly simultaneous, price information must travel while both markets are 
open. 
In the reverse direction, there does not seem to be an effect of London price 
changes on the New York market.  Table 1.2 confirms previous research that information 
generally flows from the home market to the domestic market, but not the other way 
around.  We cannot detect information traveling from London to New York by this 
method.  The only significant t statistics are t = 0, 1, and 2.  Again, cross-sectional 
variances close to the event day were somewhat lower than other variances in the event 
window, partially explaining the large significant t statistics on these days.  However, the 
poor results could be a consequence of defining an event as a change in the London 
security price and not the converted price. 
Steamship crossing times generally confirm the analysis.  The New York Herald 
(January 15, 1865) catalogues the transatlantic passage of several major steamship lines 
for the year 1864.  While certainly other vessels made the voyage, these lines held the 
postal contracts and were probably among the faster steamers.  In fact, the financial press 
mentioned several of these ships by name during the year as transporting news, specie, 
and securities.  Consider a typical voyage between New York to Liverpool.  The average 
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travel time, based on about seventy voyages of two steamship lines, was 11.9 days; 
westbound was 13.2 days (where five hours was subtracted from eastbound traffic and 
added to westbound traffic in order to account for the time difference).  The fastest 
westbound steamers proceeded in about nine or ten days.  Recovering an information 
transmission of ten days from the event study seems fast given that average travel time 
was somewhat longer.  Ships did not leave port every day, and most ships were slower 
than the fastest ship.  But since information-bearing vessels probably traveled faster than 
average, recovering an information lag of about ten days from stock prices roughly 
accords with observed steamship travel time. 
We can test the robustness of the result with a joint test for significance.  Simes' 
(1986) modified Bonferroni test evaluates the joint significance of a set of p-values.  
Consider T different null hypotheses H1 to HT with size a.  We want to test the joint null 
hypothesis H0 = {H1, ... , HT}.  For each test compute a p-value pt.  Rank the T p-values 
from least to greatest, p(1) to p(T).  The original Bonferroni test rejects the null hypothesis 
H0 if p(1) £ a/T.  The original Bonferroni test is quite conservative.  Simes' modified 
Bonferroni test rejects the null hypothesis H0 if for any i p(i) £ ia/T.  Simes proves that 
the test has correct size for independent uniform distribution and performs Monte Carlo 
simulations that suggest the modified test may deliver increased power at roughly 
nominal size for other distributions, even under correlation. 
The joint tests confirm the result.  In our case, Ht is that the t statistic associated 
with the test statistic zt at event time t is statistically significant.  The joint hypothesis H0 
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is that all T of the t statistics are statistically significant, where T = 9 because nine was 
the last significant t statistic from the event study.  Both the original Bonferroni test and 
Simes' modified Bonferroni test reject the null hypothesis H0 for a = 5% for the event 
study that the London market reacted to information from New York.5 
We might worry that the test is slightly misspecified.  As seen in Table 1, event 
time statistics of length 15 through 18 are positive.  Under both the null and the 
alternative, both test statistics should be zero.  One explanation is that some information 
bearing vessels did take more than two weeks to bring information across the Atlantic.  
Suppose that vessels leave port twice a week and that new information originates in New 
York just after the previous vessel leaves port.  In this case, a fast ship that was delayed a 
few days en route could take more than two weeks to bring information to London.  But 
the effect is present for greater event times t = 17 and 18.  It is unlikely, although 
possible, that transatlantic voyages were so long.  Another explanation is that positive test 
statistics could also result from the clustering of events.  The price differential that falls at 
a large event i at time t (relative to event i) might also be the price differential for another 
event j at a smaller event time t' < t (relative to event j).  Thus, test statistics could be 
slightly inflated. 
                                                 
5.  Alternatively, we can estimate the change in the structure of information using cointegration analysis.  
First, fill missing prices by linear interpolation.  Regress the London price on leads and lags of the New 
York price.  A residual-based test indicates a cointegrating relation.  Estimate the cointegrating vector by 
Stock and Watson's (1993) DGLS.  Hypothesis tests on the cointegrating relation indicate that before the 
telegraph was in place, information traveled from New York to London in ten to thirteen days, but no 
significant relationship can be detected from London to New York.  Af ter the telegraph was in place, 
information traveled from New York to London in zero to two days, but there is only limited evidence that 
information traveled from London to New York. 
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Even if the test were slightly misspecified, the qualitative results remain similar.  
Suppose we subtract the mean of the last four t statistics (event times t = 15 to t =18) 
from the t statistics from event times t = 0 to t = 14.  The mean of the t statistics for event 
time t = 15 to t = 18 was 0.64.  After this adjustment, Table 1.1 shows that t statistics for 
event times 2 and 6 remain significant at the 5% level, while t statistics for event times 1, 
5, 7, and 8 are marginally significant at the 10% level.  The Bonferroni (and Simes' 
modified Bonferroni tests) do not reject the null hypothesis that the t statistics for event 
times t = 0 to t = 8 are jointly significant at the 5% level, but they both reject at the 10% 
level.  So we might infer that cable transmission time was perhaps between zero and one 
days, and that the fastest information-bearing ships traveled between nine and ten days. 
Changing the definition of an event in New York does not radically alter the 
results.  First, we can alter the threshold of the definition of an event.  Recall that an 
event was defined as a price change in the converted price of Erie of greater than 2.35.  
We can increase or decrease the threshold to generate less or more events.  Adjusting the 
threshold of a price jump to add or subtract 5 events does not change the significance of 
the t statistics.  Further, we can discount events resulting from the Union victories just 
prior to the end of the Civil War.  While a few t statistics become marginally significant 
(four remain significant at the 5% level, while four more t statistics remain significant at 
the 10% level), the estimate of vessel travel time does not decrease below nine days even 
when Civil War events are omitted.
 
Conclusion 
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Chapter 1 studies the change in capital market information flows between New 
York and London due to the introduction of the Atlantic Cable.  The evidence from an 
event study suggests that the information lag shortened from ten days to zero days.  The 
telegraph had an immediate impact on the price convergence of one security.  Because 
London prices quickly incorporated newly available price information from New York, 
the London market may be semi-strong form efficient. 
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Appendix 1A 
 
Appendix 1A describes the data set.  The data consist of daily prices from the 
New York Times and the London Times for the period of August 1864 to July 1868 for the 
$100 common shares of the New York and Erie Railroad.  Both papers quote prices in 
terms of percentages in the local currency.  We select Erie because it was the only dual 
listed security that had both a relatively consistent series of data and enough volatility to 
make an event study feasible.  Daily data on the full New York and London markets 
during this period are currently unavailable.   
In New York, the data consist of daily sale prices for the First Board of the New 
York Stock Exchange.  These prices quote the actual registered sales transactions 
concluded by member brokers taking place roughly during the hours of 10–12 AM.  
While the purpose was to obtain trades exactly synchronized with the London market, the 
trades could have taken place anywhere within this time frame.  The price quoted was the 
last listed spot price on the first call of the First Board.  As the list of trading prices 
follows a continuous pattern, it seems reasonable to assume that they are listed in 
chronological order; using the average price of spot price sales on the First Board does 
not change the results.  On the rare occasion when there was no trade on the First Board, 
we substitute a price from the Second Board (in the afternoon), the closing price of the 
day, or the 10 AM Open Board of Brokers. 
The London data includes two series of prices.  The first is the list of actual trades 
throughout the day.  Actual trades are less frequent for the beginning and the end of the 
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data set.  The second price series is a closing price spread.  Unfortunately, if no trade took 
place on a particular day then the closing price spread often matched the spread of the 
previous day.  This suggests that if there was no market activity, then the London Times 
did not update the closing price spread and left the old numbers in print.  In this case, no 
market activity is indistinguishable from identical activity on successive days.  Because 
of the paucity of actual trades at the beginning and end of the data set, we used the 
average of the closing price spread.  While it is common for financial studies to examine 
only price data, we might be interested in sales volume.  Unfortunately, my sources do 
not record London volume for American securities. 
Comparing prices in New York and London requires currency conversion 
(Michie, [1987], p. 61).  Both papers report prices as percents of par in the domestic 
currency.  In order to compare New York and London prices, we convert the New York 
price into the London price.  First, greenback dollars were converted to gold dollars.  
During this period the US was on the paper greenback standard.  Gold dollars traded at a 
premium to paper dollars.  As the gold premium could fluctuate throughout the day, we 
average the daily high and low from Mitchell (1966).  Second, we convert gold dollars to 
English pounds at an exchange rate of based on the price of a sixty-day bill of exchange 
in New York adjusted for the interest component.  The exchange rate fluctuated around 
the par exchange rate of 4.87 gold dollars per pound.  Finally, London firms quoted US 
securities at a customary exchange rate of 4.44 (Davis and Hughes, [1960], p. 55).  This 
is also the procedure employed by Schmidt (1875). 
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Data limitations forced an approximation in the conversion procedure.  
Examining the London reaction to New York price changes involves converting at the 
London exchange rate.  Unfortunately, we lack daily information on the exchange rate in 
London.  In the absence of such information, we simply converted at the New York rate.  
Thus, the converted New York price incorporates an exchange rate set in New York that 
is as old as the stock price information instead of the current London dollar-pound 
exchange rate. 
The exchange rate data derives from issues of the New York Herald and the 
Merchants' Magazine, supplemented by the New York Times and Tribune.  Leading 
bankers provided buy-sell quotations on sixty-day bills of exchange.  Bills of exchange 
served as the primary instrument of foreign payments, although merchants occasionally 
substituted Erie shares or US federal bonds.  Exchange rates varied across papers due to 
the heterogeneous quality of issuers and endorsements as well as the lack of a centralized 
market. Quotations on shorter duration bills were only available during peak exchange 
movements. 
In order to obtain a spot exchange rate I discounted sixty-day bills of exchange.  
As noted by Perkins (1978) and Officer (1985) and confirmed by Schmidt (1875), the 
correct discount rate is the London rate.  We obtain a monthly series of English interest 
rates on three-month bankers' bills in Great Britain from the NBER's website (series 
m13016 at http://www.nber.org/databases/macrohistory/contents/chapter13.html).  Linear 
interpolation created a daily rate.  Since the interest component of the bill depends on 
future expectations of interest rates, we gave arbitrageurs perfect foresight and used the 
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arithmetic average of the discount rate over the duration of the bill. In the pre-telegraph 
period, we allow arbitrageurs knowledge of the current English interest rate even though 
this information was not available in the market.  American quotations of the English 
interest rates were too infrequent to permit easy construction of a consistent daily series.  
Schmidt ([1875], p. 202) states that arbitrageurs allowed fifteen extra days of interest to 
account for the delay in presentation at London, so I followed this practice as well. 
A final adjustment corrected for both markets quoting forward prices.  NYSE 
rules allowed traders to deliver stocks by 2:15 PM the next day.  Thus, prices quoted in 
New York were one-day forward trades.  We make no adjustment for the trades in New 
York.  In contrast, by the mid-nineteenth century the London market was a time market, 
and nearly all trades were settled on a fortnightly settlement day.  To account for the 
forward trades, we discount the London prices by the interpolated market rate of interest.  
In general, the price change was less than a tick size (1/8th).
The data also had to be adjusted for dividend payments.  Erie common shares paid 
three 4% dividends during this period.  Often one market would begin quoting the 
security without the dividend while the other market still included it.  Although more 
complicated methods would yield a more accurate calculation, we simply adjusted the 
price by the converted magnitude of the dividend.  This omission ignores at least two 
factors.  First, the value of the dividend should be discounted at a short-term interest rate 
when quoted on only one market.  Second, dividends payable on the continent were most 
likely received by ship later than dividends payable in New York.  All three dividends 
occurred before the telegraph connection.  The lack of adjustment of interest rates may 
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add to the pre-telegraph variability.  Changes in quotations due to the timing of dividend 
quotations were not counted as events. 
34
Figure 1.1: Erie Common Share Price Difference, 1864-8
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Table 1.1:  Event study results, New York events 
 
 
  Difference in     Approximate  
  Standardized    Degrees of Modified 
 Event time  Means  t statistics  Freedom t statistics 
 
0  1.125  2.197 **  44  1.553  
1  1.387  2.397 **  43  1.753 * 
2  2.017  3.356 **  35  2.712 ** 
3  1.654  2.254 **  27  1.61  
4  1.826  2.024 *  28  1.38  
5  2.16  2.603 **  24  1.959 * 
6  2.631  2.915 **  36  2.271 ** 
7  2.322  2.399 **  36  1.755 * 
8  2.388  2.586 **  32  1.942 * 
9  1.536  2.033 *  27  1.389  
10  1.948  1.679   21  1.035  
11  0.831  0.747   27  0.103  
12  2.282  1.882 *  20  1.238 
13  0.751  0.697   32  0.053 
14  0.509  0.652   33  0.008 
15  0.327  0.447   40  -0.197 
16  0.343  0.572   34  -0.072 
17  0.62  0.962   31  0.318 
18  0.444  0.595   34  -0.049 
 
** = significant at 5% level (two-tailed test) 
* = significant at 10% level (two-tailed test)   
 
Modified t statistics = subtract mean of last 4 t statistics 
(t = 15 to t = 18)   =  0.644 
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Table 1.2:  Event study results, London events 
 
 
 Difference in     Approximate   
  Standardized    Degrees of 
Event time  Means  t statistics  Freedom 
       
0  1.518  3.447 **  37 
1  1.128  2.373 **  36 
2  1.356  2.118 **  29 
3  0.919  1.324   29 
4  0.91  1.395   26 
5  -0.272 -0.509  27 
6  0.705  0.757   25 
7  0.253  0.318   33 
8  0.289  0.324   24 
9  0.489  0.566   29 
10  0.144  0.196   28 
11  0.464  0.602   27 
12  0.376  0.526   30 
13  0.274  0.366   28 
14  0.163  0.243   39 
15  0.586  0.737   26 
16  0.182  0.252   33 
17  0.012  0.019   43 
18  0.482  0.717   35 
 
 
** = significant at 5% level (two-tailed test) 
* = significant at 10% level (two-tailed test) 
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"It is known, understood, and anticipated, by all who have dealings with the banks, that 
they are in the habit of preparing systematically for making creditable exhibits on quarter 
day." 
 
H. R. Hulburd, Comptroller of the Currency, 
Annual Report of the Comptroller of the Currency 1867, p. vii. 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
 
In March 1869, Congress changed the way national banks reported their balance 
sheets to regulators.  Under the National Bank Act of 1864, all national banks submitted 
balance sheets to the Comptroller of the Currency on the first Monday of each quarter.  
The 1869 amendment directed the Comptroller of the Currency to call five times a year 
for reports of previous dates of his choice.  Congress intended that the new reporting 
procedure would eliminate the incentive for banks to window dress their balance sheets. 
Window dressing is a temporary change in portfolio designed to produce a more 
appealing report to regulators or to the public.  Window dressing obscures the health of 
individual banks by systematically altering underlying balance sheets.  Mismeasured data 
can bias tests and may lead to policy errors. 
Chapter 2 tests for window dressing of national bank balance sheets during the 
period 1866–1871.  The Philadelphia Clearing House Association provides a weekly 
series of aggregate balance sheet items.  After slight adjustments, we can compare this 
weekly series to quarterly reports made by the banks to the Comptroller of the Currency. 
The comparison test provides some evidence for window dressing.  At first, there 
does not appear to be evidence of window dressing because the two reports coincide 
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before the 1869 change in the reporting law.  But a comparison of bank behavior before 
and after the change in the law indicates that window dressing might have been present.  
Comparing the two series suggests that if nothing changed other than the law, then the 
associated Philadelphia banks window dressed their reserves by $900,000 or by about 
5%. 
 
Introduction 
 
Congress designed the 1869 amendment to the National Bank Act of 1864 to 
prevent national banking associations from window dressing their balance sheets.  In a 
statement to the Senate on February 23, 1869, John Sherman of the Senate Finance 
Committee remarks:  
The present law requires four quarterly statements to be made, giving 
certain facts.  They are required to be made at periodical times, and the banks are 
generally doctored up or prepared for these reports, so that now a contraction 
occurs just before the reports are made, and after that an expansion, creating a 
palpable and visible fluctuation of the currency at these times.  This amendment 
requires five reports during the year, and authorizes the Comptroller to call for 
them at a day past, so that they will not be prepared to doctor up their reports.  
(Congressional Globe, 40th Cong., 3rd sess., 1869, pt. 2:1482.) 
 
Senator Sherman attributes variability in the money market to window dressing by 
national banks during quarterly reporting dates.  The purpose of the amendment was to 
prevent banks and other market participants from anticipating reports by making the bank 
statements a surprise.   
Window dressing decreases the effectiveness of bank regulation.  Both academic 
economists and government regulators use historical data to test hypotheses about the 
bank industry and to prescribe policy.  In the presence of window dressing, bank statistics 
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submitted to regulatory authorities systematically mismeasure benchmark portfolios.  
Friedman and Schwartz (1970, p. 212–3) state that window dressing may cause academic 
economists to overestimate historical banking reserves.  Also, bank regulators may fear 
that poor data accuracy could cause policy errors.  For example, window dressing may 
prevent the early detection of bank distress.  Regulatory agencies attempt to prevent bank 
failures (White [1992], p. 14).   Problem banks may temporarily dress their balance 
sheets in order to appear financially sound.  In cases where early warning may prevent 
insolvency, window dressing decreases the usefulness of reported balance sheets. 
Modern bank regulators show concern about window dressing.  In 1984 the 
Securities and Exchange Commission censured six banks for window dressing assets by 
at least 10% (Allen and Saunders [1992], p. 590).  In 1962 the Comptroller of the 
Currency suspected that national banks were window dressing deposits and resources in 
order to appear larger than competitors.  By this time, some call reports lacked surprise 
value as 24 of the 25 previous December call reports fell on the last business day of year.  
So in 1962 the Comptroller of the Currency surprised banks by calling for reports on 
December 28 instead of on the last business day of the year, December 31.  When 
comparing the report to the Comptroller on December 28 and reports to the Federal 
Reserve on December 31, deposits grew by $5.7 billion or 2.6% over three days.  While 
the increase might represent a year-end effect, bankers admitted window dressing 
(Comptroller of the Currency [1963], p. 14). 
Recent research questions whether or not banks would have an incentive to 
undertake window dressing.  One reason for reporting requirements is that the 
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composition and the performance of bank asset portfolios are usually considered to be 
private information.  For example, theories of bank monitoring such as Calomiris and 
Kahn (1991) assume that only the banker knows the true underlying bank asset returns 
while depositors receive an imperfect signal.  Recent corporate governance and brokerage 
analyst scandals suggest that firms hold private information unavailable to investors.  But 
Smirlock and Kaufold (1987) argue that investors could discern the relative exposure of a 
1982 sample of US banks to defaults on Mexican debt, even though bank portfolio 
holdings were not publicly announced.  If market participants can perceive true 
underlying portfolios, there is no incentive for banks to mislead investors by window 
dressing.  However, Smirlock and Kaufold do not discuss how market observers obtain 
this information.  Extracting asymmetric information from share prices becomes more 
difficult during the nineteenth century because bank shares were highly illiquid.  In any 
event, the presence of window dressing would indicate that bank reports are informative 
to investors.  Presumably, banks would not waste resources on costly window dressing if 
investors could discern their true asset portfolios. 
Bank regulators devised reporting methods to detect window dressing.  Window 
dressing is an information cost paid by bank regulators to obtain private information 
about bank balance sheets on a fixed date.  The solution of Congress in 1869 was to 
randomize reports over dates in the past.  If banks do not know when the reporting date 
will fall, they will not be able to "doctor up" their reports in advance.  A disadvantage of 
random past date reporting is that variation in the reporting date captures seasonal 
variation in the data series.  In order to eliminate seasonal fluctuation, statisticians at the 
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Federal Reserve insisted on calling for reports on fixed dates (White [1992], p. 18).  
Another solution increases the frequency of reports to abbreviated monthly or weekly 
balance sheets.  The cost of compliance and of supervision increases as the frequency and 
the detail of the reports increases.  Alternatively, bankers can submit an average over a 
substantial length of time.  This procedure decreases the usefulness of a point estimate if 
the variance in underlying variables is large.  Regulators often require both time averages 
and a point estimate.  Allen and Saunders (1992) exploit this feature of balance sheet 
reporting to examine window dressing of U.S. banks. 
Allen and Saunders (1992) claim that modern data exhibit upward window 
dressing in assets of about 2.5%.  The authors acquired individual level data on large 
banks for the period 1978–86.  They compare assets as specified on a bank’s call report 
date to a monthly or quarterly average.  Allen and Saunders find that assets as measured 
by a call report point estimate exceeds the previous monthly average by about 2–3% with 
seasonally detrended data.  They present weaker evidence of a decrease in assets after the 
reporting date.  Unfortunately, the authors assume independence in cross section of their 
measure of window dressing. 
 
Design 
 
Allen and Saunders (1992) discuss several motives for window dressing reserves.  
Banks have an incentive to upward window dress reserves in order to meet reserve 
requirements.  In addition, high reserves signaled liquidity of the banks' portfolio to 
depositors in case of a run.  Nineteenth century depositors relied on forecasts of bank 
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solvency since deposit insurance did not exist during this period.  Instead of holding 
liquid reserves, banks preferred riskier short-term loans to speculating stockbrokers.  The 
Comptroller notes that the New York banks held almost half ($70 out of $160 million) of 
their loan portfolio in call or short-term demand loans to stockbrokers (Comptroller of the 
Currency [1868], p. xxii–xxiii; he classifies an additional $110 million in certified checks 
as speculative money). 
The authors also mention that shareholders may prefer downward window 
dressing.  Downward window dressing indicates higher profits when managers employ 
otherwise idle reserves.  If shareholders were ignorant of their bank’s condition, they may 
approve of extra reserves as currency cushions shareholders against bank runs.  Section 
12 of the National Bank Act (Robertson, [1968], p.197–8) specified that in case of bank 
failure shareholders were liable for the par value of the share in addition to their 
investment. In the end, empirical analysis must resolve the actual direction of the effect. 
Ignore other types of window dressing and focus on upward window dressing 
reserve requirements.  While Allen and Saunders empirically test for window dressing 
assets, nineteenth century financial regulators were more concerned about banks window 
dressing reserve levels.  In order to window dress reserve requirements, banks can either 
increase reserves or decrease liabilities that required reserve.  For reserve cities such as 
Boston and Philadelphia, section 31 of the National Bank Act of 1864 (Robertson, 
[1968], p. 203) specifies that reserves must be at least 25% of the sum of deposits and 
bank note circulation.  Reserves included specie (gold coin, silver coin, and gold 
certificates), U.S. legal tender notes (greenbacks and certain other forms of paper 
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government currency), deposits with a redeeming agent in New York, and clearing house 
certificates payable in lawful money.  At least two-fifths of the required 25% reserve 
must consist of specie or legal tender notes in the vaults of the bank (see also Banker’s 
Magazine [July 1868], p. 62).  So increasing the reserve ratio required an increase in 
specie, legal tenders, or deposits at New York or a decrease in circulation or reserves.  
Unfortunately, actual reserve ratios are not recoverable from weekly data.  The data lack 
information on deposits due from redeeming agents.  However, several of the individual 
series of the reserve ratio are available: specie, legal tender notes and bank note 
circulation. 
Consider the numerator of the reserve ratio, which includes specie and legal 
tender notes.  Friedman and Schwartz ([1963], p. 28) note that both a greenback dollar 
and a gold dollar counted as one dollar of reserves even though gold dollars traded at a 
premium to paper greenback dollars in the market.  So for the purpose of window 
dressing reserves, increasing legal tender notes was more cost-effective.
The temptation to window dress bank liabilities was ambiguous.  While a 
decrease in circulation or deposits would increase the reserve ratio, bankers may have 
been reluctant to purposefully decrease these balance sheet items.  Circulation and 
deposits may have prestige value as they indicate the size of a bank. 
 Banks used several methods to window dress reserves.  Cornwallis (1879, p. 48–
9) notes that banks sought “to borrow deposits for a single day in any way they could, 
and to reduce loans to directors for a few hours….”  The most straightforward method 
was to convert assets to cash.  For example, bankers can augment reserves by suitable 
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manipulations of short-term loans.  Bankers can arrange for loans to come due just before 
the reporting date.  One might expect loans to decrease around the reporting date.  
However, any decrease in loans around the reporting date should appear as an increase in 
liquid assets, such as legal tender notes.  Thus, it suffices to look at a series of legal 
tender notes. 
So one test of window dressing looks for increased holdings of U.S. legal tender 
notes by banks around the call date.  Hence, the effect is exactly what Senator Sherman 
described: a contraction of the currency around the reporting dates.  If banks really 
window dressed their balance sheets, we can find evidence for the contraction by 
examining bank holdings of legal tender notes.  This study tests whether or not bank 
window dressing directly caused currency contractions by examining bank portfolios. 
 
Method 
 
One test of window dressing compares reported reserves to an underlying series 
of holdings.  The advantage of using historical data is the availability of two sets of 
reports of reserves on roughly the same set of banks.  In his Annual Report, the 
Comptroller of the Currency published quarterly aggregate balance sheets of national 
banks by state and reserve city.  The test requires an additional series of balance sheet 
data from between the quarterly reporting dates.  Bankers demonstrate reluctance to 
distribute balance sheets because they reveal private information about bank portfolios.  
Allen and Saunders (1992) test for window dressing by comparing a monthly or quarterly 
average to a quarter-end report that were both reported to regulators.  Although section 
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34 of the National Bank Act (Robertson, [1968], p. 204) required banking associations to 
submit abbreviated monthly reports, these were not available. 
Clearing house associations provide a second series of data.  The clearing houses 
of major metropolitan areas published weekly aggregates of member banks' condition. 
Clearing house associations expedited the daily balance of payments among banks and 
provided for mutual defense during financial crises.  Some major clearing house 
associations required members to submit weekly average balance sheets, which were then 
published in local newspapers.  Gorton and Mullineaux (1987) describe how self-
monitoring by the coalition relieved information asymmetries and permitted clearing at 
par among member banks.  These weekly statements from the clearing house serve as a 
benchmark of bank holdings. 
If the two series measured the same accounting item on an identical set of banks, 
we could test the two series for consistency and hence for window dressing.  However, in 
most cities, the two sets of banks covered by aggregates statistics do not coincide.  The 
Comptroller's reports of condition include a few national banks that were not members of 
the local clearing house, while the clearing house aggregate weekly statement would 
include state-chartered banks that did not fall under the jurisdiction of federal regulators.
The presence of state banks could obscure the presence of window dressing in 
aggregate data.  Aggregate data may not reveal window dressing when only one class of 
banks submits a report.  National banks may borrow reserves from state banks, leaving 
the aggregate statistics unchanged on the quarterly reporting day.  For this reason, the 
nation's premier money market, New York, is a less desirable choice with only aggregate 
  
46
 
data.  Several New York City banks retained state charters and maintained membership in 
the New York Clearing House.  While individual level data can circumvent this problem, 
there is another solution. 
A fortuitous historical circumstance allows a comparison between the 
Comptroller's quarterly reports and the clearing house series of Philadelphia.  Only 
national banks belonged to the Philadelphia Clearing House by the end of 1866.  Most 
state banks converted to national banks shortly after Congress announced the taxation of 
state bank note circulation.  State banks did not reenter the Philadelphia market until 
1869 and did not join the Clearing House at least until after 1871.  Unfortunately, we are 
left with the problem of national banks remaining outside the clearing house. 
The two aggregate series cannot be directly compared because not all of the 
national banks joined the clearing house.  Two Philadelphia national banks remained 
outside the clearing house as of 1867.  These two banks are included in the Comptroller's 
aggregate reports but are not included in the clearing house series.  Once the 
Comptroller’s aggregate reports are adjusted for the two extra banks, a first test compares 
the Comptroller’s aggregate reports of legal tender notes to the clearing house weekly 
average series of legal tender note holdings.  If the Comptroller’s reports lie above the 
benchmark clearing house weekly average, this indicates window dressing. 
Comparing the two data series allows for a cleaner test of the hypothesis.  Instead 
of the nonparametric version of the comparison test, we could investigate the time series 
properties of the clearing house series to test for window dressing.  The test looks for 
increases in the time series of legal tender reserves around the weekly reporting date.  
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However, the time series analysis suffers from several drawbacks.  The series requires 
seasonal adjustment, but we observe only a small number of seasonal cycles over five 
years of data.  Also, time series analysis requires stationarity and distributional 
assumptions on the residual process.  Finally, the time series test has low power.  
Suppose that banks window dressed their balance sheets for one day.   The weekly 
average consists of a six-day time average.  Thus, a one-day increase in reserves will be 
divided by six in the weekly average of the clearing house.  Even a large amount of 
window dressing, when divided by six, is difficult to detect against the background 
variance of the series.6  The nonparametric test trades these assumptions for the 
requirement that nothing changed other than the reporting law. 
 
Data 
The weekly reports of the aggregate condition of members of the Philadelphia 
Clearing House approximate the twenty-eight associated banks’ underlying portfolios.  
Clearing houses published aggregates of a few important items including loans, deposits, 
specie, legal tender notes, and bank note circulation.  The Banker's Magazine printed at 
least portions of these series. Supplementing this source were the individual level reports 
of clearing house member banks contained in the Philadelphia Public Ledger and the 
Philadelphia Inquirer.  We consider data for the period 12/1866 – 11/1871 (260 weeks) to 
match the series of reports from the Comptroller.
                                                 
6.  Time series tests of the Philadelphia Clearing House legal tender weekly average series based on a 
seasonal ARMA model accept the null hypothesis of no window dressing.  The time series tests also accept 
the null hypothesis that banks window dressed their balance sheets by a large amount. 
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The national banks reported their balance sheets to the Comptroller of the 
Currency quarterly before the change in the law and five times a year afterwards.  In his 
Annual Report, the Comptroller publishes aggregates of full balance sheets of all national 
banks by state and by reserve city.  Abstracts of the aggregate reports from 1867 to 1871 
appeared in the Banker's Magazine.  Since the law changed on March 3, 1869, this yields 
nine reports before the law changed and twelve reports afterward. 
The Comptroller's aggregate reports require adjustments before comparing them 
to the clearing house series.  First, the Comptroller's aggregates include the two national 
banks that did not belong to the Philadelphia Clearing House.  The Comptroller's series 
can be corrected because the Comptroller's reports and daily newspapers occasionally 
published quarterly reports of individual banks.  Second, we lack precise information 
about the clearing house definition of legal tender notes.  For more information about 
legal tender data issues, see Appendix 2A. 
 
Test 
 
Chapter 2 tests whether or not banks window dressed their balance sheets.  The 
test compares the sequence of reports of the Comptroller to the underlying weekly 
averages of the clearing house.  If reports to the Comptroller exceed reports to the 
clearing house before the change in the law, then there is evidence of window dressing.  
However, this test assumes that the two sets of reports ought to be equal in the absence of 
window dressing.  Consider the counterfactual world without reports to the Comptroller.  
Perhaps the counterfactual condition of the banks is systematically above or below the 
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weekly average.  To account for this possibility, a more general version of the first test 
compares the excess of the Comptroller’s report over the clearing house averages before 
and after the change in the law.  If nothing changed other than the law, a decrease in the 
excess of the Comptroller’s report over the clearing house report from the period before 
the law changed to the period after the law changed may also suggest window dressing.  
Ideally, the call reports after the change in the law surprise the banks and reveal their true 
condition.  We can use the reported condition of the banks after the law changed to 
approximate the counterfactual condition of the banks before the law changed.  
For notation, let xq be the qth aggregate quarterly report of legal tender note 
holdings by Philadelphia banks (adjusted for the two banks that were not members of the 
Clearing House).  Subdivide the q's into those that fell before and after 1869 amendment.  
Let q = 1 to 9 be the nine quarterly reports (1/67 to 1/69) that fell before the change in the 
law and let q = 10 to 21 be the twelve call reports that fell after the change in the law 
(4/69 to 10/71).  Let yt represent the series of Philadelphia Clearing House weekly 
average of U.S. legal tender notes.  Let yq denote the clearing house weekly average of 
U.S. legal tender notes for the week of the quarterly report q.  Now define the differences 
between the aggregate reports of the Comptroller and the clearing house weekly average.  
Let bq = xq - yq for q in 1 to 9 and aq = xq - yq for q in 10 to 21. 
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The test compares the behavior of the banks before and after the 1869 
amendment.  Suppose that no bank window dresses its balance sheet.  If nothing changed 
other than the law, then the difference between the adjusted Comptroller's reports and the 
clearing house reports should be the same on average before and after the change in the 
law.  That is, test the null hypothesis that no window dressing took place: 
  E(bq) = E(aq).      (2.1a) 
 
A restricted version of this test assumes that in the absence of window dressing, the 
Comptroller’s report and the clearing house weekly average should coincide.  In this case 
there should be no difference between the two sets of reports after the change in the law, 
so restrict E(aq) =0.  Test the null hypothesis of window dressing before the change in the 
law with: 
  E(bq) = 0.      (2.1b) 
 
Replace the expectations by their sample analogues to obtain testable restrictions.  The 
test will appeal to nonparametric statistics due to small sample sizes. 
 
Results 
 
 At first glance, Figure 2.1 presents little evidence of window dressing.  Figure 2.1 
graphs the Philadelphia Clearing House legal tender note series along with the aggregate 
report to the Comptroller adjusted for the two non-member banks.  Figure 2.1 indicates 
that reports to the Comptroller appear close to the clearing house series before the law 
changed.  But after the 1869 amendment, reports to the Comptroller fall below the bulk 
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of the clearing house.  There does appear to be some difference between the two series 
before and after the change in the law. 
 The test compares the Comptroller’s reports to the weekly averages from the 
clearing house and suggests that, all else equal, window dressing took place on the order 
of a million dollars.  A t test of (2.1a) estimates the magnitude of the difference between 
the two samples.  An F test does not reject the null hypothesis of equal variances (F = 
1.85, 10% critical value = 2.52), so proceed with a t test pooling the variances across the 
samples of aq's and bq's (although an approximate t test with different variances does not 
change the results).  The difference between the mean of the sample of bq's and mean of 
the sample of aq's was $923,668 and was significant (t = 4.11, 5% critical value = 2.09) 
under an independence assumption.  If all else remained equal before and after the 
change in the law, the t test concludes that window dressing averaged about $900,000 per 
quarter. 
Nonparametric tests verify that the two samples are drawn from different 
distributions.  A non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test examines the null hypothesis that 
two random samples have the same median (Beyer [1991], p 309; Rice [1991] contains 
other versions).  In this case, the two samples are the excess of the Comptroller's reports 
over the clearing house average (adjusted for the two missing banks) before and after the 
change in the law.  The Mann-Whitney U statistic checks if the observed bq's and the aq's 
are independent draws from two different distributions.  The U statistic was significant at 
better than the one percent level (U = 11, 1% critical value  = 18), suggesting that the two 
distributions are in fact different. 
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Most of the apparent difference between the two samples derives from the 
Comptroller's report falling significantly below the weekly average after the change in 
the law.  Reports to the Comptroller do not appear to exceed the clearing house weekly 
averages before 1869 amendment.  A t test of (2.1b) is not significantly different from 
zero (t = 0.71, 5% critical value = 2.306).  Thus, most of the $900,000 difference must 
result from the period after the change in the law.  The average difference between the 
adjusted Comptroller's reports and the clearing house weekly averages for the period after 
the change in the law is significantly different from zero (t = 5.87, 5% critical value = 
2.201).  The call reports dropped substantially below the weekly average reported to the 
clearing house after the change in the law.  Counterfactually, in the absence of reporting 
requirements, the reports to the Comptroller would have been about $750,000 under the 
clearing house weekly averages before the law changed. 
Why did reports to the Comptroller fall significantly below the clearing house 
average after the change in the law?  Several possibilities may explain the result.  First, 
reports taken on the first Monday of each quarter may differ systematically from reports 
taken at other times.  If banking practices at the beginning of the quarter could explain 
window dressing, then surely the Comptroller during this period, an experienced banker, 
would be aware of it.  Also, the timing of call reports after the change in the law varied 
according to the whim of the Comptroller.  Perhaps the Comptroller chose dates 
specifically after a short-term shock struck the money market.  Neither official directive 
nor informal communication suggests that the Comptroller restricted his attention to the 
health of banks during adverse monetary conditions.  Most often the calls for reports 
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came about a week after the date required for report, so the Comptroller may not have 
had time to observe a trough in the money market.  Further, several calls fell during the 
seasonal ease of the spring money market. 
  A second explanation considers intraweek fluctuations in bank holdings.  
Friedman and Schwartz (1970, p. 213) note that intraweek variation may cause sizable 
fluctuations in local money markets.  If payday was Friday, banks would drain reserves 
by paying out cash.  Call reports taken from the close of business on Saturday or early 
during the week would therefore lie below a weekly average.  All of the reports before 
the change in the law and most of the call reports after the change in the law fell during 
the beginning of the banking week.  Additional support for this hypothesis notes that the 
difference between the two reports appears somewhat larger than the average of the other 
reports for the three call reports that fell on Wednesday or Thursday.  However, this story 
does not explain why the differences on these days are negative.  According to the 
explanation, the banks should have built up cash reserves late in the week.  So reports to 
the Comptroller should exceed the clearing house averages when the report fell late in the 
week, but they do not.  Reports can not fall below the weekly average on every day of the 
week. 
A third possibility notes a decrease in the supply of legal tender notes that 
occurred mostly before the 1869 amendment.  Although this effect goes in the wrong 
direction to explain why the Comptroller’s report fell below the clearing house weekly 
averages after the law changed, it might explain the average $900,000 discrepancy before 
and after the change in the law.  If the supply of legal tender notes was decreasing, the 
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Comptroller’s Monday morning quarterly report of legal tender notes will appear above a 
weekly average from the clearing house.  Throughout 1867, the Treasury contracted the 
supply of legal tender notes at a rate of $4 million a month in an attempt to lessen the 
gold premium.  Other forms of paper government currency also declined.  From Figure 1, 
we know that aggregate legal tender notes (including compound interest notes and three 
percent certificates) in Philadelphia fell from about $20 million to $13 million (excluding 
the two missing banks) before the change in the law.  Hence, the supply of legal tenders 
in Philadelphia dropped $7 million over about 100 weeks.  Distributing the decrease 
linearly over the two years yields a weekly decrease of $70,000.  Comparing reports early 
in the week to a weekly average halves the trend.  So, perhaps $35,000 of the difference 
between the Comptroller’s report and the clearing house weekly average before the 
change in the law is due to the currency contraction.  A similar calculation can be 
performed after the law.  In either case, the decrease in the supply of legal tender notes 
fails to explain the average $900,000 difference before and after the change and the law. 
A final explanation is an unknown mismeasurment of the legal tender series or a 
change in the definition of the variables.  We lack precise information about exactly what 
the clearing house column "legal tenders" represents.  The calculations did not include 
items such as bills of other national banks, checks and cash items, or exchanges for the 
clearing house under the heading of legal tenders.  None of these items should be 
considered substitutes for U.S. legal tender notes. Changes in the inclusion of these items 
fail to explain the large excess of the clearing house reports over reports to the 
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Comptroller after the change in the law.  Appendix 2A provides more information about 
adjusting the clearing house definition of legal tender notes. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 This chapter examined U.S. legal tender note holdings of Philadelphia national 
banks during the period 1866–1871 in order to detect window dressing.  If reporting 
standards did not change and all else remained equal before and after the change in the 
law, a t test suggests that Philadelphia banks window dressed on the order of $900,000 
out of an average of about $15,000,000 of legal tender note holdings, or about 5% in the 
aggregate.  Again, any evidence for window dressing hinges on the requirement that 
nothing changed other than the law.  A complete solution would explain why reports to 
the Comptroller of legal tender note holdings of the associated banks fell below their 
weekly average after the change in the law. 
  
56
 
Appendix 2A 
 
Appendix 2A describes adjustments to the legal tender holdings of the 
Philadelphia banks.  The first adjustment facilitates direct comparison between the 
Comptroller's aggregate reports and the weekly averages of the Philadelphia clearing 
house.  This adjustment corrects the Comptroller’s quarterly aggregates for the two 
national banks that remained outside the Philadelphia clearing house in order compare the 
two data series.  Unfortunately, individual level data on quarterly reports are not 
immediately available.  One approach notes that Section 34 of the National Bank Act of 
1864 (Robertson [1968], p. 204) required national banks to publish abstracts of their 
individual balance sheets in local newspapers.  In compliance with the law, banks placed 
advertisements of their balance sheets in the paper of their choice.  Banks scattered their 
individual reports among the various papers of the city.  One possible solution is to 
collect these quarterly reports of individual national banks that did not join the clearing 
house and subtract them from the aggregate.  This was easiest for the city of Philadelphia, 
as there were only two banks outside the Philadelphia Clearing House.  The city of 
Boston had at least four, while New York had about eight national banks outside their 
respective Clearing Houses during this period. 
In the absence of a complete series of quarterly reports, we estimate the legal 
tender holdings of the two remaining banks outside the clearing house.  We collected a 
handful of individual quarterly reports for the two Philadelphia banks.  The collection 
currently includes all four quarterly reports of 1867 for both banks, but almost no further 
quarters.  The 1867 reports allow estimation of the holdings for the quarters in other 
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years.  The Comptroller's Annual Report provides individual level data for all national 
banks for the October report.  However, the October report is not an appropriate estimate 
for the other quarters due to seasonal variation in reserves.  So we estimate the remaining 
reports of a given year by appropriately upweighting the October report for that year.  
The weight chosen was the ratio of the average of the other three quarterly reports for 
1867 to the October report for 1867.  As the 1867 quarterly reports for the National Bank 
of Germantown printed in the newspapers also included specie in its declared amount of 
legal tender notes, we subtract the specie declared in its 1867 October report (less than 
$2000). 
Another difficulty is that the definitions of "legal tender" of the Comptroller and 
the clearing house may have had different meanings.  While the Comptroller annotates 
his accounting definition in his 1868 report, several items other than legal tender notes 
may or may not have been included in the clearing house definition.  A weekly statement 
for the New York Clearing House from 1900 (Cannon [1908], p. 184) limits legal tender 
notes as the only input to the column headed "legal tender."  Although they lacked legal 
tender status, fractional currency, bills of other banks, cash items, and clearing house 
exchange might plausibly have been placed under the heading "legal tender."  However, 
accounting changes in these items are either far too small or far too large to explain the 
discrepancy between the two measures of legal tenders that appears when the law 
instituted call reports. 
Further, we lack an official statement about which days of the week the clearing 
house averages represent.  But according to an example in the money column of the 
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Philadelphia Inquirer (October 1, 1867), clearing house averages are turned in on 
Saturday and are composed of an average of the closing statements of the previous 
Saturday through Friday.  We used this definition of a weekly average in the absence of 
more precise information.  Before the 1869 amendment, we treat reports from the 
Comptroller on a Monday before the opening of business as a Saturday report at the close 
of business. 
We obtain information about membership in the Philadelphia Clearing House 
from local newspapers.  Philadephia newspapers printed individual weekly averages of 
the member banks of the clearing house.  This raises a question of why the Philadelphia 
national banks that were members of the clearing house ought to bother window dressing 
since their weekly average individual balance sheets were publicly available.  Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that smaller, weaker banks still attempted to increase their reserve 
holdings over the quarterly report (money column, Philadelphia Inquirer, April 8, 1868).  
However, window dressing by weak banks may have occurred at the expense of reserves 
of larger and stronger banks, so that no change appears in the aggregate. 
59
Figure 2.1
Philadelphia U.S. Legal Tender Notes, 1866-71
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"It follows, therefore, that the seven banks, all of which paid interest upon deposits and 
which had secured the bulk of the bankers' deposits, were directly responsible for any 
disturbance in the New York money market, which was due to the use of these funds, and 
also for any failure to meet demands for their return to banks in the rest of the country." 
 
  O. M.W. Sprague (1910), p. 20–1 
  History of Crises under the National Banking System 
 
 
 
 Chapter 3 
 
Chapter 3 conducts an econometric test of Diamond and Dybvig's (1983) theory 
of bank runs as interpreted by Calomiris and Gorton (1991).  Diamond and Dybvig 
employ an exogenous liquidity shock to depositors in order to develop a theory of bank 
runs.  Calomiris and Gorton interpret the exogenous liquidity shock as a seasonal 
withdrawal from the nation's agricultural interior.  This chapter reexamines the 
hypothesis that a seasonal interior reserve drain served as the exogenous liquidity shock 
before the bank panics of 1873 and 1893 in the United States.  Using individual bank 
level data in New York, this chapter tests whether the banks that held most of the 
deposits from the interior, the "interest-paying" banks, experience reserve drains just 
before the panic.  The evidence reveals that the 1873 panic could have been triggered by 
a seasonal interior drain, as interest-paying banks sustained large withdrawals in the last 
few weeks before the panic started.  But just before the panic of 1893, interest-paying 
banks did not suffer heavy reserve drains.  Diamond and Dybvig's model cannot be 
applied to the bank panic of 1893 without a non-seasonal interpretation of the exogenous 
liquidity shock. 
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Introduction 
 
Although game-theoretic models of bank crises have existed for at least twenty 
years, there have been few econometric tests of the theory.  A long literature beginning 
with Bryant (1980) and Diamond and Dybvig (1983) models bank runs of depositors on a 
single bank.  Most subsequent empirical papers, such as Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 
(1998), limit themselves to establishing stylized facts about bank crises rather than 
explicitly testing the theory.  One exception is Madiès (2001), who tests the Diamond and 
Dybvig (1983) model with a laboratory experiment.  Madiès observes bank panics in the 
laboratory, although a bank run by all subjects is rare.  Another exception is Calomiris 
and Gorton (1991), who use historical data to evaluate an interpretation of Diamond and 
Dybvig's theory of bank runs. 
The model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) remains one of the most theoretically 
influential explanations of bank distress.  In order to generate bank runs, these authors 
specify that some depositors, called "impatient" agents, experience a random exogenous 
liquidity shock that motivates them to withdraw deposits.  The agents expect the shock to 
occur, only the agents do not know the identity of which particular subset of the agents 
will experience the shock.  Two equilibria emerge for the behavior of the agents who are 
not exogenously motivated to withdraw, the "patient" agents.  In the equilibrium with a 
bank run, each patient depositor expects other depositors to withdraw funds, in which 
case it is a best reply to withdraw.  In the equilibrium without a bank run, each patient 
depositor expects other depositors to keep their funds in the bank, so no run occurs.  The 
alternation between equilibria explains the presence or absence of bank runs.  In their 
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theory, Diamond and Dybvig assume that a certain class of depositors always withdraws 
without explaining why these exogenous withdrawals take place.  More recent theoretical 
advances, such as Allen and Gale (2001), also rely on an exogenous shock to create bank 
distress. 
In one explanation of the theory, Chari (1989) identifies the exogenous liquidity 
shocks with seasonal agricultural requirements for currency.   In the nineteenth-century 
United States, banks in the interior often deposited funds with money center banks in 
New York in order to obtain interest.7  Periodic agricultural activity, such as planting and 
harvesting, create a seasonal transactions demand for money.  At harvest time, banks on 
the agricultural interior of the country would withdraw cash from money centers such as 
New York.  The seasonal liquidity requirement fits the theory because the seasonal shock 
is exogenous and, although its magnitude and timing were somewhat stochastic, market 
participants anticipated its fluctuations.  Further, the interpretation of the exogenous 
liquidity requirement as a seasonal agricultural withdrawal connects with traditional 
investigations of the seasonal recurrence of financial crises in central money markets.  
Jevons (1884) suggests that the monetary needs of country patrons created an annual 
currency shortage every autumn in the English money market during the mid-nineteenth 
century.  Kemmerer (1910) observes that financial crises in the US often coincided with 
                                                 
7.  In fact, the pyramid reserve clause of the National Bank Act of 1863 allowed interior banks to count 
some deposits on money-center banks as cash reserves in the vault for the purpose of fulfilling a reserve 
requirement.  However, the National Bank Act was not the cause of interior banks loaning funds to New 
York banks.  Myers [(1931), Chapter 6] shows that banking practice predated the pyramid reserve clause. 
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seasonal fluctuations of the money supply.  Miron (1986) argues that the Federal Reserve 
prevented panics between 1914–28 by accommodating seasonal monetary movements. 
Following this explanation of the exogenous liquidity shocks, Calomiris and 
Gorton (1991) equate Diamond and Dybvig's theory of bank panics with seasonal 
withdrawals on money center banks.  Calomiris and Gorton apply the Diamond-Dybvig 
model to the National Bank Era by identifying country banks in the nation's interior with 
"depositors" and the large banks of New York with "the bank" in the model.  Calomiris 
and Gorton then evaluate the seasonal withdrawal hypothesis. 
Calomiris and Gorton provide many arguments against a seasonal explanation of 
nineteenth century financial crises.  The authors use historical data to refute the seasonal 
hypothesis, but they never use statistical tests to evaluate their assertions.  Although they 
offer additional evidence against the seasonal hypothesis during and after panics, focus 
on their analysis of pre-panic periods.  First, they describe how currency shipments do 
not match the seasonal hypothesis.  In particular, data on currency shipments after 1899 
show no unusual outflows from the New York banks just before the panic of 1907, at 
least when compared to 1906.  Calomiris and Gorton also compare changes in aggregate 
reserve ratios and aggregate deposits of New York member banks across years during the 
four calendar weeks preceding each panic.  Their premise is that the biggest reserve 
shocks should correspond to panic years.  Instead, they that find that changes in the 
reserve ratio and deposits in panic years were unexceptional when compared to the same 
calendar weeks in non-panic years.  
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But it is not obvious why the perceived lack of correlation between large pre-
panic drains and bank panics refutes the theory of Diamond and Dybvig.  Unlike Smith 
(1991), who creates panics with large seasonal shocks, Diamond and Dybvig generate 
their panics with multiple equilibria.  Fluctuations in the size of the shock need not 
influence equilibrium selection in the version of the model without aggregate risk.  
Further, Calomiris and Gorton consider only the aggregate reserves of the New York 
banks.  However, interior deposits were not distributed equally among the New York 
banks.  A better test would focus on those New York banks that held interior deposits. 
In his classic analysis of the panics, History of Crises under the National Banking 
System, the prominent economist Sprague (1910) highlights the reserve position of a 
subset of New York banks, called "interest-paying banks" by contemporary observers.   
A key feature of interest-paying banks was not the payment of interest on demand 
deposits but rather the solicitation of interior balances.  While many banks paid interest 
on demand deposits, large interest-paying banks specialized in accepting demand 
deposits from banks located on the interior of the country, so that the interest-paying 
banks' deposit portfolios consisted largely of interior bank balances.  Under the seasonal 
withdrawal hypothesis we should observe that the interest-paying banks suffer large 
percentage reserve drains on the eve of a panic.  Aggregate statistics could conceal a 
shock to these individual banks. 
Both Sprague and New York Clearing House leadership expressed concern about 
the stability of interest-paying banks.  In the absence of a central bank, the New York 
Clearing House was the premiere financial institution in the United States during the 
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nineteenth century.  All of the largest and most influential New York banks were 
members of the New York Clearing House, a voluntary association of banks designed to 
expedite payments among member banks.  The leaders of the New York Clearing House 
understood the vulnerability of the interest-paying banks and attempted to ban the 
payment of interest on demand deposits several times.  In a far-sighted report on banking 
practices in 1873, George S. Coe and a committee of Clearing House members described 
how twelve interest-paying banks suffered nearly two-thirds of the total drain reserve 
drain on all sixty member banks while only consisting of only half of total member 
deposits (Sprague, p. 93).  In the presence of the large reserve drain during the panic, we 
might expect the drain on the interest-paying banks to begin before the panic starts. 
Using individual level data, we can test the assumption of a seasonal drain by 
examining withdrawals on interest-paying banks.  This chapter extends the analysis of 
Calomiris and Gorton by providing an econometric test of the seasonal interpretation of 
Diamond and Dybvig.  The test employs individual bank level data on New York banks.  
The seasonal hypothesis implies that interest-paying banks should suffer a reserve drain 
as the crisis begins.  If the existence of seasonal drains should be rejected, then we must 
either discard the theory of Diamond and Dybvig or provide another explanation for the 
source of the exogenous liquidity shock. 
 Several authors consider alternative explanations of bank runs that are not 
evaluated here.  This chapter investigates the hypothesis that an exogenous shock from 
the interior triggered the panic and takes the position that the drain on interest-paying 
banks was a cause and not a result of financial instability.  Hence, it ignores a causal role 
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for shocks to the value of bank assets as described by Calomiris and Gorton and modeled 
by Rochet and Vives (2001) and Goldstein and Pauzner (2002).  It also ignores 
international pressure on foreign exchange markets as a source of bank distress.  
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Glick and Hutchison (1999) discuss interaction 
between banking crises and currency crises and consider evidence from international 
panel data.  In the context of the 1893 crisis, Friedman and Schwarz (1963) assert that the 
panic was the result of international deflation abroad (p. 111).  Milller (1996) argues that 
foreign exchange rate speculation concerning the maintenance of the gold standard 
caused an internal drain during June–July of 1893. 
 
 Design 
Instead of testing the theory of Diamond and Dybvig outright, Chapter 3 tests the 
interpretation as described by Calomiris and Gorton.  Several difficulties impede a direct 
test of Diamond and Dybvig's model with historical data.  The theory is static (although 
Temzelides [1997] considers an evolutionary dynamic version), but most existing bank 
data are dynamic.  Gorton (1988) notes that Diamond and Dybvig do not describe why 
beliefs change.  Consequently, researchers turn to testing the theory's assumptions.  If the 
assumptions of the theory are false, then the theory does not explain observed 
phenomena.  Diamo nd and Dybvig assume that a certain class of depositors always 
withdraws.  Calomiris and Gorton interpret this assumption as seasonal withdrawals by 
interior banks on New York banks.  Of course, other non-seasonal interpretations of the 
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exogenous liquidity shock could provide evidence for the model of Diamond and Dybvig, 
but alternate interpretations are not evaluated here. 
This chapter tests for seasonal reserve drains on New York banks just before 
major financial crises.  In Diamond and Dybvig's static model, the two observed 
equilibria are 1) complete liquidation of the bank and 2) withdrawals only by impatient 
agents (those who were exogenously motivated to withdraw).  In both equilibria under 
the seasonal interpretation, New York banks with a connection to the interior should 
suffer seasonal reserve drains.  However, since in the real world withdrawals are 
dynamic, we might expect withdrawals to take place over a period of time.  So we will 
look for seasonal reserve drains in the last few weeks before the panic begins. 
This chapter tests the theory before the two largest financial crises of the late 
nineteenth century in the United States, the panics of 1873 and 1893.  The first, the panic 
of 1873, fits the classic pattern of panic chronology.  Sprague (1910) and Wicker (2000) 
describe the seasonal stress on the money supply and the sharp break in asset prices just 
before the panic.  These authorities agree that the beginning of the panic of 1873 
coincided with the failure of a prominent banking house in mid-September, 1873.  Figure 
3.1 graphs aggregate total net deposits (net deposits plus bank note circulation) of New 
York Clearing House member banks from January 1872 to September 1873.  The black 
line denotes the beginning of the panic.  The visible seasonal highs and lows correspond 
to agricultural requirements of the money market, and it is easy to understand the 
importance of the seasonal interpretation at this period in the nation's history. 
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Unfortunately, individual bank level data does not exist during the panics.  During 
crises, the New York Clearing House Association attempted to counteract the panics.  
One form of relief was the issue of clearing house loan certificates to needy members, a 
form of temporary emergency loan (Cannon [1908], chapter 10 or Hoag [2002b]).  Once 
protective measures were in place, the associated banks no longer published the balance 
sheet by individual bank.  So, for the purposes of this study, the data end just before the 
associated banks took concerted action in September 1873. 
The year 1893 has both advantages and disadvantages for testing hypotheses 
about panics.  In its favor, most historians note the large internal drain from the interior.  
Wicker (p. 52) describes how, unlike most other bank panics, interior bank suspensions 
and failures were unusually numerous during this panic.  Since we know interior banks 
experienced stress, we might expect large withdrawals from New York banks, whether of 
seasonal origin or not. 
The panic of 1893 was somewhat unusual when compared to other banking crises 
of the nineteenth century for other reasons.  Another difference was the long period of 
unease in financial markets before the actual crisis.  Sprague marks the price collapse of a 
stock market favorite in February 1893 as the first stage of the crisis before the partial 
suspension of payments in August 1893, when certain banks refused to pay large 
depositors in cash (Noyes [1894], p. 25).  Large declines in asset prices also took place in 
early May 1893.  Defining when the panic actually begins is critical to testing the 
hypothesis because the hypothesis specifies the behavior of depositors at the beginning of 
  
69
 
the panic.  We might misunderstand panic behavior if we use the wrong starting date for 
the panic. 
 The year 1893 limits the available data.  In 1893, New York Clearing House 
leadership recognized the unsettled state of the money market nearly two months before 
the crisis reached a critical height.  The Clearing House issued loan certificates in 
mid-June 1893, while partial suspension of payments did not occur until August.  The 
early issue of loan certificates means that the data ends in June, so we may not expect the 
seasonal hypothesis to apply to this case.  Mid-summer was not known for its seasonal 
stress on the money supply.  In practice, Calomiris and Gorton also date panics from the 
issue of New York Clearing House loan certificates.  In other years, such as 1873, the 
Clearing House did not take preemptive action so data up to the actual suspension are 
available. 
Evidence from banking aggregates suggests that dating the panic from June 1893 
may be a reasonable choice.  Figure 3.2 graphs aggregate total net deposits (net deposits 
plus bank note circulation) for the New York Clearing House banks for January 1892 to 
June 1893.  The aggregates are available during the panic even though individual level 
statistics are not.  The banks clearly experienced difficulty in early 1893.  A serious 
downturn in aggregate total net deposits begins the week of June 10, 1893 (the black line 
in the figure), when the Clearing House decided to issue loan certificates.  Total net 
deposits stayed low for several months before returning to its 1892 level.  While the 
money market was unsettled prior to June 1893, it seems reasonable to date the last stage 
of the crisis of 1893 as beginning in early June. 
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Data 
The data include the weekly statements of the 63 New York Clearing House 
member banks for the 76-week period January 1892 to June 1893 and for the 60 member 
banks for the 91-week period January 1872 to September 1873.  The weekly bank 
statement carried weekly averages of key balance sheet items, including net deposits and 
bank note circulation.  Net deposits included such items as deposits due individuals, 
deposits due to other banks, and unpaid dividends, but subtracted out deposits due from 
other banks, bank notes of other banks, and other cash items.  Define total net deposits as 
the sum of net deposits and bank note circulation.  Appendix 3A contains further 
information about the data. 
Since we lack measures of reserve flows, we turn to measures of deposits.  The 
hypothesis is framed in terms of the flow of reserves: interest-paying banks remitted cash 
to the interior.  However, we only have data on the stock of reserves and must impute the 
flows as best we can from the stocks.  While it might seem most natural to test the 
hypothesis by examining reserves, changes in reserves do not measure cash outflows by 
the bank.  A bank could make payments without changing the level of reserves by calling 
in loans or liquidating other assets.  Changes in deposits will capture some loan collection 
and therefore may measure reserve drains better than changes in reserves.  However, 
Myers (p. 409) suggests that empirically changes in reserves might be a better proxy than 
changes in deposits for seasonal money flows. 
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One data problem impedes a test for a reserve drain on interest-paying banks.  We 
lack precise information about which banks held interior deposits.  Cross-sectional data 
on the amount of interior deposits accepted or rates of interest paid are not available.  
Instead, we can use information on the amounts of bankers' balances owed to any bank, 
whether from the interior or otherwise, as a proxy for holding interior bankers' balances.  
Four or five times a year state and national banks submitted reports of condition to 
government regulators.  These reports document the holdings of banker's balances by 
individual bank during the years 1872 and 1892.  The year before the panic measures 
bankers' balances better than the actual year in case there were large drains during the 
panic.  Averaging over all four or five reports avoids seasonal variation in the level of 
bankers' balances in New York. 
The definition of "interest-paying bank" splits the banks into two classes.  The 
classification attempts to detect those banks with a large fraction of their deposit portfolio 
in interior balances.  Banks with the highest proportion of bankers' balances will suffer 
the largest proportionate reserve drains.  Define an interest-paying bank as owing more 
than one-half of total gross deposits (individual plus bankers') to other banks in the 
reports to regulators in 1872 or 1892.  Banks fall into one class or the other for the entire 
sample period.  This definition selects 9 of 60 banks in 1872 and 13 of 64 banks in 1892 
as interest-paying banks.  Admittedly, the binary classification is a crude proxy for 
possessing liabilities due to the interior.  Non-interest-paying banks accepted bankers' 
deposits, so the classification is a difference of degree not of kind.  An alternative 
classification, defining an interest-paying bank as owing 40% or more of its total gross 
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deposits to other banks (selecting 12 of 60 banks in 1872 and 18 of 64 banks in 1892 as 
interest-paying banks) does not affect the qualitative results.  Using the ratio of net 
bankers' balances to total net deposits does not substantially affect the classification. 
By definition, bankers' deposits formed a substantial fraction of the large interest-
paying banks' liabilities.  The business of large interest-paying banks depended on 
interior bankers' balances as a source of funds.  In both 1872 and 1892, bankers' balances 
averaged about two-thirds of gross deposits for the interest-paying banks.  Non-interest-
paying banks held only about 20% of their gross deposit portfolio in bankers' balances. 
Bankers' deposits were concentrated in a small number of interest-paying banks.  
While many national banks paid interest on interior deposits, a few banks commanded 
most of the balances.  The New York interest-paying banks possessed 64% of the 
bankers' balances held by the New York Clearing House member banks in 1872 and 55% 
in 1892.  Sprague (1910) implicates the seven largest interest-paying banks in 1873, and 
the definition of an interest-paying bank used here includes Sprague's seven banks.  The 
Coe Report of 1873 issued by the New York Clearing House puts the number at 12.  
Minor alterations to the classification will not affect the results.  Sprague (p. 17–8) notes 
that the concentration of bankers' deposits was not compensated by size or a more 
cautious reserve position, as these seven banks held 20% of the capital and 18% of 
individual deposits of the national banks of New York, as well as the legal minimum 
reserve ratio of 25%. 
Graphical evidence from 1872–3 lends credence to a seasonal explanation of 
panics.  Figures 3.3 and 3.4 record, respectively, the total net deposits for the interest-
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paying banks and non-interest-paying New York Clearing House member banks in 1872–
3.  Both interest-paying banks and non-interest-paying banks appear to suffer reserve 
drains at the end of the panic, although the drop is sharper for the interest-paying banks.  
However, the seasonality experienced by the non-interest-paying banks is rather 
surprising.  Figures 3.3 and 3.4 look nearly identical.  Remember, the non-interest-paying 
banks hold only a third of the bankers' balances.  Yet from seasonal peak to trough in 
autumn 1872 these banks lose more deposits than the interest-paying banks.  This 
suggests that seasonal effects are not limited to agricultural withdrawals by interior banks 
or that bankers' balances do not proxy interior deposits. 
 Graphical evidence from 1892–3 suggests that a seasonal drain did not take place 
before the panic.  Interestingly, aggregate data on member banks in Figure 3.2 does not 
record the same seasonal pattern as in the earlier years of 1872–3.  We know that 
seasonal fluctuations persisted because Miron (1986) and Champ, Smith, and Williamson 
(1996) document the seasonality of deposits and nominal interest rates in New York at 
least until 1910.  If anything, non-interest-paying banks rather than interest-paying banks 
suffered the reserve drain just before the data ends.  Figures 3.5 and 3.6 depict, 
respectively, the total net deposits for interest-paying and for non-interest-paying New 
York Clearing House member banks in 1892–3.  Both sets of banks experience a decline 
in total net deposits over time.  In the last three weeks, the total net deposits of the 
interest-paying banks continue their mild decline.  In contrast, the non interest-paying 
banks suffer a sharp decrease in total net deposits.  This decrease offsets the sharp 
increase in deposits of late April and early May 1893.  So it appears unlikely that 
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econometric analysis will uncover a large shock to the interest-paying banks toward the 
end of the series.  Given the time of the year of each panic, we would probably expect a 
seasonal drain in autumn 1873 but not in mid-summer 1893, and the tests below agree 
with this prediction. 
Several other authors test the importance of seasonal capital flows.  Counter to 
Sprague and Kemmerer, Goodhart (1969) argues that seasonal westward capital flows 
should induce higher interest rates in New York and hence create an equilibrating 
eastward capital flow in the autumn.  James ([1978], p. 127–148) critiques Goodhart's 
theory and evidence.  Goodhart's argument characterizes equilibrating capital flows after 
seasonal flows have taken place, so seasonal flows could still exist.  Empirically, 1900–
13 was not a representative period of seasonal flows.  More importantly for this chapter, 
Sprague (1910) attempts to link seasonal flows with the panic of 1873.  Sprague 
compares the reserve position of the two classes of banks just before the outbreak of the 
panic of 1873 using the weekly statements of Clearing House member banks (p. 34–5).  
He finds a decline in the reserve ratio of both interest-paying and non-interest-paying 
banks before the panic of 1873.  For the purpose of testing the hypothesis that interest-
paying banks suffered reserve drains, we want to try to isolate reserve flows rather than 
examine the reserve ratio.  The test reformulates Sprague's method and tests for statistical 
significance. 
 
 Test 
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This section tests for a reserve drain on interest-paying banks just before the 
panics begin. Interest-paying banks, by definition, held a large fraction of their deposit 
portfolio in bankers' balances.  If seasonal withdrawals are the exogenous liquidity 
requirement that triggers crises, we expect interest-paying banks to suffer large 
percentage reserve drains.  We test this hypothesis by examining the aggregate 
percentage deposit changes of both classes of banks just before the panic begins.  Rather 
than focusing on the reserve losses of individual banks, the test focuses on the aggregate 
percent changes in deposits of the two classes.  Holding bankers' balances is not 
necessarily the most precise proxy for accepting interior deposits.  Slight differentials in 
the proportion of bankers' balances to total deposits may not correlate with an increase in 
the vulnerability to seasonal withdrawal.  Most likely, the large disparity between the 
aggregates of the two classes will correlate with seasonal drains if they exist. 
 In order to test the hypothesis, this chapter employs a time series cross section 
(TSCS) regression model with separate time-specific variables for each class of banks.  A 
regression model easily accommodates a more robust correlation structure for the 
residuals.  Let IP it be an indicator variable that is 1 if bank i is an interest-paying bank at 
time t and zero otherwise.  Let NIP it be an indicator variable that is 1 if bank i is not an 
interest-paying bank at time t and zero otherwise.  Consider the following TSCS model of 
bank deposits: 
yit  =   µ + a i + g yit-1 + qt (IP it) + lt (NIPit ) + eit,   (3.1) 
 
where µ is the constant term, a i captures individual bank effects, and e it is an error term 
for bank i at time t.  The individual bank subscript i ranges from 1 to N and the time 
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subscript t ranges from 2 to T because of the lagged dependent variable.  The variables qt 
and lt represent time shocks common to interest-paying banks and non-interest-paying 
banks, respectively, at each time t.  Additional lagged dependent variables could be 
included in (3.1), but estimation indicates that the fit was not dramatically improved, so 
these are omitted.  The seasonality apparent in Figure 3.1 should be modeled as well, but 
capturing annual seasonal fluctuations with at most 20 months of data proves intractable. 
The presence of both individual effects and time indicator variables raises 
problems of perfect multicollinearity.  Typical estimation sweeps out the time effects by a 
matrix operation (see Hsaio [1986], p. 53).  In this application, the time indicator 
variables are the parameters of interest.  In order to avoid perfect multicollinearity, at 
least two indicator variables must be dropped from the model.  Interpretation of the time 
coefficients as time shocks to each class of bank requires the presence of all time 
indicator variables.  Removing a time indicator variable changes the interpretation of the 
remaining coefficients from a mean shock to a comparison with the omitted period.  So, 
actual estimation omits two individual fixed effect parameters (one of each type of bank) 
as well as the constant term.  The qualitative results turn out to be invariant to the 
individual bank variables excluded. 
Instead of estimating the model with a complete set of T-1 time indicator 
variables, consider a restricted form of (3.1).  Suppose the right-hand side variables 
consist only of a complete set of T-1 time indicator variables.  Then the residual 
covariance matrix estimated by more general regression techniques such as feasible 
generalized least squares is singular.  In the presence of other regressors the covariance 
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matrix is invertible but becomes ill-conditioned, causing estimated standard errors take 
implausibly low values.  Since we are interested in the behavior of bank reserves just 
before the panic begins, it is convenient to suppose that the mean drain for both classes of 
banks is constant over time except for just before the panics.  Equation (3.2) restricts 
(3.1) by equating early time shocks for the first T-3 time periods: 
yit  =   µ + a i + g yit-1 +  q0 (IP it) + l0 (NIPit )  + e it. t < T-2   (3.2) 
yit  =   µ + a i + g yit-1 +  qt (IP it) + lt (NIPit )  + eit t = T-2, T-1, T. 
 
Equation (3.2) constrains the first T-3 time shocks to be equal for each class of banks.  
The new parameter q0 enforces the restriction q2 = q3 = ... = qT-3 and l0 represents the 
restriction l2 = l3 = ... = lT-3.  Equation (3.2) then allows separate shocks for the last 
three periods for each class of bank.  Estimating two or four time effects separately 
instead of three yields similar results. 
 Equation (3.2) does not provide any causal information about the source of the 
shock.  The purpose of (3.2) is to determine whether interest-paying banks suffered some 
kind of reserve drain in the last three periods before the panic.  Under the seasonal 
hypothesis, we expect large capital flows leaving New York just before the panic.  But 
even if we observe a drain on interest-paying banks, observed deposit changes need not 
have a seasonal origin.  However, if we do not observe large changes in deposits, then 
perhaps we would have some evidence that models based on large seasonal outflows 
might not agree with the data.  Further, we observe only the net changes in deposits, so 
the presumption is that no large offsetting inflows mask the possible existence of 
seasonal outflows. 
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Testing reserve drains requires standardization of the dependent variable by the 
size of the bank.  Interest-paying banks were larger than non-interest-paying banks.  
Naturally, we expect interest-paying banks to experience a greater outflows of reserves 
simply because they have more liabilities.  One option is to consider the percentage 
change in deposits as the dependent variable.  Interest-paying banks held a greater 
proportion of interior balances in their deposit portfolio.  In the event of large 
withdrawals from the interior, we expect interest-paying banks to sustain a larger 
percentage drain in deposits than non-interest-paying banks.  But the average of the 
percent changes need not resemble the percent change of the aggregate, especially for 
small percentages as in the present case. 
A slight transformation of the dependent variable improves the interpretability of 
the coefficients.  The transformation allows OLS estimation of the coefficients qt and lt 
to be interpreted as aggregate percentage changes for their respective class of banks at 
time t.  Instead of dividing changes in deposits for bank i by the deposits of bank i as in 
the percent change, divide by the average deposits of the class of bank i (interest-paying 
or not).  Let Ci be the set of banks that are the same type of bank (either interest-paying 
or not) as bank i.  For example, if bank i is an interest-paying bank, then Ci is the set of 
interest-paying banks.  Let TNDit be total net deposits (net deposits plus bank note 
circulation) for bank i at time t.  Define yit as 
yit  =   å
Î
-
--
iCj
jti
itit
TNDC
TNDTND
1
1
)/1(
)(100 ,      (3.3) 
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where |C i| is the number of banks in the class of bank i.  Multiplying by 100 yields a 
percentage.  If time indicator variables are the only parameters on the right-hand side of 
(3.2) and the dependent variable yit is defined as in (3.3), then OLS estimation of the 
parameters qt and lt measure the aggregate percent change in deposits of the interest-
paying banks and the non-interest-paying banks at time t, respectively. 
 To verify the interpretation of the coefficients, suppose that a complete set of time 
indicator variables are the only RHS variables in the model.  That is, consider estimation 
of (3.1) with µ = g = a i = 0 for all i.  As is well known, OLS estimation of a panel time 
indicator variable calculates the cross-sectional mean of the dependent variable at time t.  
Because the time indicator variables for the two classes of banks are orthogonal, joint 
estimation including both qt and lt yields the same estimates as separate OLS estimation 
for the two classes of banks.   The cross-sectional mean of the dependent variable in (3.3) 
for each class of banks is 
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or the percentage change of total net deposits for the class of bank i at time t.  So OLS 
computes qt and lt as the aggregate percent change in the total net deposits of interest-
paying banks and non-interest-paying banks respectively.  Further, the restriction of equal 
means for the beginning time periods q2 = ... = qT-3 in (3.2) does not change the 
interpretation of qT-2, qT-1, or qT as aggregate percent changes for the interest-paying 
banks at times T-2, T-1, or T.  However, if additional variables such as lagged dependent 
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variables or individual fixed effects are included in the RHS of Equation (3.2), then the 
coefficients qt and lt can no longer be interpreted as unconditional mean percent changes. 
Chapter 3 tests for a seasonal interpretation of the panics.  There are two 
hypotheses of interest.  First, under the seasonal hypothesis the interest-paying banks 
must experience a decline in deposits.  However, this is only a necessary condition as a 
reserve drain on interest-paying banks need not have a seasonal origin.  Second, an 
alternate possibility is that the exogenous shock fell upon the non-interest-paying banks.  
Instead of a story about an exogenous seasonal withdrawal, perhaps some other 
explanation describes why non-interest-paying banks sustained an exogenous shock.  In 
this case we are interested in the withdrawals on non-interest-paying banks, as well as 
comparing the withdrawals sustained by the two classes of banks.  If neither type of bank 
(nor the aggregate of both types) suffers an exogenous withdrawal just before the panic 
begins, then Diamond and Dybvig cannot explain panics at all. 
A first test determines if interest-paying banks suffered a reserve drain before the 
panics, whether of seasonal origin or otherwise.  Time dummy variables model shocks to 
the money market.  At each time t, non-interest-paying banks experience a common 
reserve shock qt, while interest-paying banks experience a common reserve shock lt.  
The question is whether or not the magnitude of qt is large.  Even though most versions 
of Diamond and Dybvig's model can be supported by an arbitrarily small liquidity 
requirement, most subsequent literature focuses on historically large seasonal shocks, so 
we will continue in that tradition here.  The null hypothesis states that interest-paying 
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banks did not suffer reserve drains in the last few periods just before the panic.  One test 
of the null hypothesis is qt = 0 where t = T-2, t = T-1 and t = T.  A simple t test evaluates 
the null hypothesis.  We can test for joint significance of the three coefficients by the 
usual Wald test.  If some of the coefficients qt from t = T-2 to T should be statistically 
significant, we would reject the null hypothesis and consider the existence of seasonal 
drain.  We can repeat the same method on the lt coefficients to determine whether or not 
the non-interest-paying banks suffered a drain, in case a story about non-interest-paying 
banks suffering an exogenous shock fits the data better. 
A variation on the first test compares shocks just before the panic to the weekly 
mean of previous shocks.  Instead of testing the hypotheses qt = 0 and lt = 0, we can test 
qt = q0 and lt = l0 for t = T, T-1, and T-2.  If time dummy variables are the only RHS 
variables, observe that q0 is just the time mean of qt over the periods prior to period T-2.  
The motivation for this test is to determine whether or not the coefficients at time t are 
equal to the time mean of shocks during non-pre-panic periods.  Since Diamond and 
Dybvig is a static model, the authors do not specify the rate at which deposits enter the 
bank.  So perhaps the relevant comparison for panic withdrawals is the average rate of 
deposit change over time.  For example, if the data should exhibit a downward time trend, 
then testing against the mean rather than zero could prevent discovering a false drain 
when a constant trend was responsible.  However, under seasonality we might expect 
some weeks to have larger shocks than others, so the time mean of shocks may not 
approximate the appropriate distribution.  In this data, estimates of the time means q0 and 
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l0 happen to be very close to zero, so the results do not depend on the type of test chosen.  
Appendix 3B summarizes the results for this test. 
A second test compares the two classes of banks directly.  If both interest-paying 
and non-interest-paying banks sustain equal shocks, then the seasonal drain does not 
explain why non-interest-paying banks suffered reserve drains.  The question is whether 
or not the two classes of banks suffered the same magnitude of shocks just before the 
panic, when seasonal drains allegedly took place but the panic was not yet underway.  
Under the null hypothesis that interest-paying banks and non-interest-paying banks suffer 
the same reserve shocks, the two time specific parameters, qt and lt, should be the same 
just before the panics.  So for t = T, we can test qT = lT.  Under the alternative, lT should 
be larger than qT because the interest-paying banks suffered the seasonal reserve drain.  
We can also test similar hypotheses for times T-1 and T-2.  Instead of the usual Wald test 
of the null hypothesis, consider a direct t test. 
A direct t test evaluates the second test comparing the two classes of banks.  The 
null hypothesis equates the time dummy parameters qt and lt at time t.  Because the Wald 
test of the equality of two coefficients is non-directional, rejection of the null hypothesis 
provides no information about which coefficient is larger.  But a direct t test of the 
hypothesis that qt = lt provides a signed test statistic.  Following Ramanathan (1995, page 
183), define dt = qt - lt and observe qt = lt + dt.  Rewrite the regression in (3.2) above as 
yit  =   µ + a i + g yit-1 + l0 (IPt + NIPt)  + d0 (IPt) + eit t < T-2   (3.5) 
yit  =   µ + a i + g yit-1 + lt (IPt + NIPt)  + dt (IPt) + eit t = T-2, T-1, T 
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by substituting for qt for all relevant t.  Note that (IPt + NIPt) is just a time indicator 
variable for time t.  Then carry out an ordinary t test on dt to test the original null 
hypothesis qt = lt, that two classes of banks suffered the same drains at time t.  Hence, 
the test statistics of interest are t tests on dT, dT-1, dT-2, a Wald test of these three 
coefficients jointly, and a Wald test of the hypothesis that dt = 0 for t = T-2, T-1 and T.  
For example, if dt is positive, then lt > qt, so the interest-paying banks would suffer less 
of a drain than the non-interest-paying banks at time t.  The only real difference between 
(3.2) and (3.5) is the interpretation of the q and d coefficients. 
 One might question whether or not the data accept the unit root restriction 
described in (3.3).  Equation (3.3) takes first differences of the data, a restriction that is 
only appropriate when the data contain a unit root.  Chang (2002) proposes a panel unit 
root test that allows for cross-sectional residual correlation.  Consider a panel 
autoregression 
 yit = a i yit-1 + uit,       (3.6) 
 
where uit is a stationary autoregressive process AR(pi) that may differ across each cross-
sectional unit i.  The null hypothesis states that for all i a i = 1, while the alternative allows 
that for some i |a i| < 1.  For each cross-sectional unit i, the test calculates the t score from 
a test of the hypothesis that a i equals 1 in a nonlinear instrumental variables regression of 
(3.6).  The function 
  F(yit -1) = yit-1 exp(-c yit-1),      (3.7) 
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where c is a constant, serves as a nonlinear instrument for the lagged dependent variable.  
Under the null hypothesis Dyit = uit , so each instrumental variables regression is 
augmented by pi lags of the first difference of the dependent variable.  Chang shows that 
each t test is asymptotically (in the time dimension T) distributed standard normal.   The 
test computes SN, a cross-sectional average of the t-scores, which is also asymptotically 
(in T) normally distributed.  In contrast to previous panel unit root tests, such as the t-bar 
test of Im, Pesaran and Shin (1997) and the Fisher test by Maddala and Wu (1999), the 
Chang SN test explicitly allows for cross-correlation among the individual panel units.  A 
test for cross-correlation reported below suggests the data require a unit root test with this 
feature.  A small Monte Carlo examination of size and power by Chang shows that the 
test performs reasonably well for the size of data set studied here.  For more information 
about the application of the Chang SN test to this data set, see Appendix 3C. 
 The Chang SN test rejects the null hypothesis of a panel unit root for the 1873 and 
the 1893 data.  The SN test on total net deposits yields an SN statistic equal to –10.23 in 
1873 and -3.38 in 1893 with four autoregressive lags (pi = 4 for all i).  Since SN is 
asymptotically standard normally distributed, the SN test rejects the null hypothesis of a 
panel unit root for both panels.  The rejection of the null hypothesis implies that at least 
one of cross-sectional unit series is stationary. 
 Despite the rejection of the null hypothesis, the unit root was imposed for two 
reasons.  First, testing the static theory requires investigating changes.  Diamond and 
Dybvig's model is a static one-shot game with no prediction about the evolution of the 
level of deposits over time.  However, the seasonal interpretation assumes that the level 
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of deposits changes prior to bank runs.  Since the data is dynamic, we need to transform 
the data in order to test the hypothesis. 
The second reason for imposing the unit root is the lack of a practical econometric 
alternative.  Two possibilities under the alternative hypothesis are that the common 
autoregressive parameter is stationary (for all i a i = a < 1) or that the autoregressive 
parameter is heterogeneous with some cross-sectional autoregressions possibly 
nonstationary.  In the first scenario, OLS fixed effects regressions yields estimated 
autoregressive parameters a in excess of 0.99.  In this case the data might as well be 
modeled with a unit root, as the estimated confidence intervals do not change much.  The 
second scenario seems more likely, with some cross-sectional units exhibiting a unit root 
and others not.  Individual unit root tests indicate the presence of a unit root in some 
cross-sectional units.  Unfortunately, there is little guidance about how to proceed when 
parameters are heterogeneously stationary or nonstationary.  Pesaran and Smith (1995) 
warn about the importance of allowing heterogeneous lagged dependent variables, but 
most papers consider only stationary autoregressions.  Each individual cross-sectional 
series could be differenced based on its own unit root test.  But unmodeled residual 
correlation across units makes individual tests inefficient and probably biases the tests.  A 
possibility might be to apply Chang's SN test to subsets of the data, but the selection of 
subsets may influence the classification of series as I(1) or I(0).  Due to the requirements 
of the theory and in the absence of a practical alternative procedure, for now we impose 
the unit root on the data despite its statistical rejection.  The rejection of a common unit 
root prevents panel-wide cointegration analysis. 
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 Estimation 
 
Now we turn to estimation of (3.2).  Since the time parameters qt and lt are 
simply time indicator variables, two standard estimation procedures are fixed effects and 
random effects.  The hypothesis of interest recommends fixed effects estimation over 
random effects.  In the fixed effects procedure, parameters are estimated conditional on 
the fixed sample.  Under random effects, the values of the parameters are drawn from a 
larger population.  Fixed effects models are considered more appropriate than random 
effects models for inference about a fixed sample (Hsaio [1986], p. 43).  This chapter 
tests a hypothesis about seasonal drains on the specific banks in the sample.  Further, as 
the time dimension T becomes large random effects estimates become fixed effects 
estimates (Hsaio, p. 49).  So for both methodological and practical reasons the method of 
choice is fixed effects. 
 Time series cross section (TSCS) methods may allow asymptotic results as T 
becomes large.  Panel data sets often involve only a few time periods T but a large 
number of cross-sectional observations on individuals N.  In contrast, these data sets are 
nearly square with T = 91 and N = 60 in 1872–3 and T = 76 and N = 63 in 1892–3.  In 
this case, it might be reasonable to employ asymptotic results in the T direction, such as 
OLS fixed effects (also known as least squares dummy variables, LSDV).  The 
coefficient on lagged dependent variables estimated by LSDV is consistent but biased in 
small samples (Nickell [1981]).  How large is the bias for moderately sized samples?  
Judson and Owen (1999) perform a Monte Carlo study to determine the magnitude of the 
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bias of LSDV regression coefficients.  In the trial most closely paralleling the results 
below with N = 100, T = 30, and a lagged dependent variable coefficient of 0.2, the 
average bias was about 10% of the lagged dependent variable coefficient's actual value, 
although biases of up to 20% fell within two standard deviations.  In our case, T = 76 or 
91 so the bias is probably about 5% or 3% of the coefficient's actual value since the bias 
is O(1/T).  While it might be possible to employ a bias corrected estimation procedure 
such as Kiviet (1995), given the small magnitude of the bias and the eventual statistical 
insignificance of the coefficient it seems reasonable to proceed with LSDV estimation. 
Organize the data in long form by grouping the regression equation in (3.2) for 
each bank i together but in time order.  That is, form yi = (yi1, ..., yiT)' and the data vector 
xi = (xi1, ... , xiT)' where xit is a K x 1 vector of data for the K RHS variables in (3.2) for 
bank i at time t.  Construct the matrix Y = vec(y1, ..., yN) by stacking the N yi vectors on 
top of each other, and construct the matrix X = vec(x1, ... ,xN) in the same way.  Now the 
data are organized in long form, with each row of the matrix (Y X) forming an 
observation on bank i at time t according to (3.2).  Let eit be the estimated residual for 
bank i at time t from the OLS regression of Y on X.   
The OLS variance-covariance matrix may require a more robust specification.  
OLS specifies that the residual covariance matrix is of the form s2I.  This description of 
the residuals imposes several restrictions.  First, estimation by OLS assumes that the 
residual for bank i at time t is independent from the residual for bank j at time t.  Also, 
OLS assumes that the residual variance s2 is constant across banks.  Both assumptions 
are suspect in this application.  If banks experience a common monetary shock, there 
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might be cross-sectional correlation at time t among the banks.  Further, if some banks 
experience more variation in withdrawals due to seasonal patterns, their deposits may 
experience a higher variance.  Another possibility is for autocorrelation of the residuals in 
time.  Although OLS regression coefficients (without lagged dependent variables) are 
still consistent in the presence of these effects, estimates of the standard errors are no 
longer correct, so tests of hypotheses are invalid. 
A standard method of allowing for more robust error structures is feasible 
generalized least squares (FGLS) as described by Greene (1993).  Instead of the usual 
matrix s2I, suppose that the residual covariance matrix is given by a more general matrix 
O.  If the residual covariance matrix O was known, we could transform the data by the 
NT x NT matrix L where L'L = Wˆ -1 and run OLS to obtain fully efficient GLS estimates.  
In practice, the residual covariance matrix O is unknown, and we perform the GLS 
transformation with a consistent estimate Wˆ  of the residual covariance matrix O to obtain 
asymptotic efficiency.  In this case, we allow for cross-unit correlation and 
heteroscedasticity but require that the residuals be uncorrelated over time.  Let Sˆ  
estimate the N x N matrix of contemporaneous covariances with typical element: 
Sˆ ij =  (å
T
1
eit ejt)/T        (3.8) 
The matrix Sˆ ij estimates the correlation between banks with the time average of the 
correlations of the OLS errors.  The full estimated panel-corrected variance covariance 
matrix Wˆ  of the error terms is then 
Wˆ  = Sˆ  Ä  IT         (3.9) 
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of dimension NT x NT.  The block diagonal form of Wˆ  embodies the assumption that the 
errors of different banks are uncorrelated in different time periods.  The FGLSbˆ  estimates 
are 
FGLSbˆ  = (X' Wˆ
-1X) -1(X' Wˆ -1Y)      (3.10) 
 
with an estimated covariance matrix of 
 
Est. Cov( FGLSbˆ ) = (X' Wˆ
-1X) -1.      (3.11) 
 
Note that if the estimated residual covariance matrix Wˆ  were the usual 2sˆ I, then the 
estimated coefficients in (3.10) are just OLS estimates and the Est. Cov( bˆ ) matrix 
collapses to the usual OLS covariance matrix 2sˆ (X'X) –1.  FGLS with cross-correlated 
errors is possible in this context because T ³ N.  If T < N, then the N x N matrix Sˆ  (and 
hence Wˆ ) would not be invertible (rank( Sˆ ) £ min{N,T}). 
A more robust estimation procedure than FGLS employs panel-corrected standard 
errors (PCSEs).   Beck and Katz (1995) propose PCSEs as a method of correcting for 
cross-correlation and heteroscedasticity.  In the presence of cross-sectional correlation 
and heteroscedasticity, OLS estimates are consistent but estimates of the covariance 
matrix are not.  The method of PCSEs retains the OLS coefficient estimates and 
calculates their covariance under the more general estimated residual covariance matrix 
Wˆ .  The estimate of the Wˆ  matrix turns out to be identical to the estimated residual 
matrix of FGLS, given by (3.8) and  (3.9).   Write bˆ for the vector of estimated OLS 
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coefficients, which the method of PCSEs retains without alteration.  Calculate the 
variance-covariance matrix of PCSEbˆ  = bˆ  by the formula 
 Est. Cov( PCSEbˆ ) = (X'X)
-1(X' Wˆ X)(X'X) -1.     (3.12) 
 
Equation (3.12) is the usual covariance matrix for the OLS estimator.  Again, if the 
estimated residual covariance matrix Wˆ  were equal to 2sˆ I as assumed under OLS, then 
the Est. Cov( bˆ ) matrix collapses to the usual OLS covariance matrix 2sˆ (X'X) -1.  Beck 
and Katz (1995, 1996) present Monte Carlo evidence that suggests that OLS with PCSEs 
performs better than other FGLS methods in sample sizes that are observed in practice. 
To avoid problems with an unbalanced panel, the estimation drops one small, 
non-interest-paying bank from each panel.  The 1873 data include a bank that closed in 
May 1873 as the result of a defalcation by a bank officer.  The 1893 data include a bank 
that joined the Clearing House in March 1892.  While the least squares dummy variable 
technique (LSDV) with time specific indicator variables easily handles the unbalanced 
panel (Greene 1993, p. 623), estimation by PCSEs is less straightforward. One option, 
casewise deletion, constructs the variance-covariance matrix Sˆ  using only observations 
in time where all cross-sectional units are present.  This method omits the data when a 
bank was absent from the calculation of Sˆ , or about nine weeks of data in the 1893 crisis 
and about 16 weeks for 1873.  An alternative, pairwise deletion, forms the variance-
covariance matrix Sˆ  by using all available pairwise combinations of errors.  Pairwise 
deletion raises questions about the small sample properties of the covariance matrix.  
Cross-correlation among banks appears more of a concern than the behavior of a new 
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bank or a bank that closed for exogenous reasons.  So the results reported in this chapter 
simply remove the extra banks.  Adding the extra banks and estimating Sˆ  by casewise or 
pairwise deletion does not affect the qualitative results.  None of the other 63 banks failed 
or otherwise left the Clearing House in 1893.  In 1873, one bank failed in the last week of 
the data set, but a report from the receiver provides data for the last week.  For more 
information about the data, see Appendix 3A. 
 
 Results 
 
 Before evaluating the results, several robustness tests select an appropriate model.  
A test detects cross-sectional correlation.  Greene ([1993], p. 661) suggests a Breusch-
Pagan (1980) Lagrange multiplier test of cross correlation of the residuals.   The Breusch-
Pagan LM test statistic, a time multiple of the sum of the lower triangular block (not 
including the diagonal) of the covariance matrix Sˆ , is  
  BP = T å å=
-
=
N
i
i
j ij
r
2
1
1
2 ,        (3.13) 
 
where r2ij is the estimated Pearson correlation coefficient for the FGLS residual eij.  
Greene (1993) notes that the appropriate null hypothesis allows for heteroscedastic errors 
without cross-sectional correlation since the coefficients of interest are pooled.  Under the 
null hypothesis, BP is asymptotically distributed chi-squared with N(N-1)/2 degrees of 
freedom.  Even though the FGLS estimates are not maximum likelihood, Greene (1993) 
suggests basing the test on the FGLS residuals.  In this case, FGLS estimation of (3.2) for 
the 1873 data yielded a test statistic BP = 3630 (p < 0.01), while for the 1893 data BP = 
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3553 (p < 0.01), easily rejecting the null hypothesis of no cross-sectional correlation in 
the residuals.  Hence, the analysis requires more robust regression techniques than OLS 
such as FGLS or OLS with PCSEs. 
A comparison of OLS, FGLS, and OLS with PCSEs suggests that OLS and FGLS 
produce overconfident standard errors.  Tables 3.1 and 3.2 present initial estimates of 
(3.2) by OLS with PCSEs for 1873 and 1893 respectively.  Beck and Katz (1995) warn 
that FGLS produces overly confident standard errors.  Several of the FGLS estimated 
standard errors are about one-half or one-third the standard errors of their OLS or PCSE 
counterparts.  However, coefficients estimated by FGLS appear similar to the results of 
OLS (and PCSEs).  Since the data reject the OLS error specification and the FGLS 
standard errors appear too small, this chapter selects the PCSEs of Beck and Katz (1995) 
in order to test hypotheses.  Note that the time indicator variables in these regressions do 
not measure aggregate percent changes in deposits because the regressions condition on 
fixed effects and include the lagged dependent variable. 
Estimation by OLS with PCSEs allows several exclusion restrictions.  The 
rightmost column in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 record estimation of (3.2) by OLS with PCSEs.  
A t test, which is asymptotically valid in this context, shows that the lagged dependent 
variable was insignificant (p = 0.54) and small in magnitude for the 1893 data.  
Subsequently, a joint F test restricting the individual fixed effects to be equal was 
accepted (p = 0.88), and the resulting indicator variable was insignificant as well (p = 
0.81).  For the 1873 data, the lagged dependent variable was marginally significant (p = 
0.07), but the magnitude was reasonably small, with g = –0.07.  Since the results are the 
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same when the lagged dependent variable is present and the significance is marginal, we 
take the liberty of dropping the variable.  The individual effects present accept the 
restriction of a common intercept using an F test (p = 1.00), and the resulting indicator 
variable was insignificant as well (p = 0.65).  The insignificance of the individual fixed 
effects is not entirely surprising.  When the dependent variable represents changes, as in 
(3.3), the fixed effect is a drift term.  Observe that bank deposits are not particularly 
monotonic, at least in the aggregate.  For the remainder of the chapter the individual fixed 
effects and the lagged dependent variable are dropped.  Now the only RHS variables 
remaining in either model are the time indicator variables.  The restrictions allow 
interpretation of the time indicator variables qt and lt as aggregate percent changes in 
TND for the interest-paying banks and the non-interest-paying banks respectively. 
Tests for autocorrelation reveal that the residuals of some of the estimates suffer 
from a small amount of autocorrelation.  Since the lagged dependent variable was set to 
zero, serial correlation of the residuals allows consistent estimation of the coefficients but 
produces biased standard error estimates, invalidating tests of hypotheses.  Lagrange 
multiplier (LM) tests for first-order autocorrelation detect a small amount of 
autocorrelation in the residuals for both 1873 and 1893.  The LM test regresses the OLS 
residuals on the lagged residuals and the right-hand side variables of the restricted form 
of (3.2), without individual fixed effects or lagged dependent variables.  The 1893 
estimated first-order autocorrelation coefficient rˆ , restricted to be equal across panels, is 
0.028.  The test statistic (NT – N)R2 = 3.73 is distributed c2(1), marginally accepting the 
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null hypothesis of no autocorrelation (0.10 > p > 0.05).  As for the 1873 data, the 
autocorrelation coefficient rˆ  equals -0.065 and the test statistic (NT – N)R2 = 22.96, 
rejecting the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation (p < 0.01).  Although the 
autocorrelation is small enough to be ignored, we investigate estimation procedures that 
allow for autocorrelation. 
Suppose that the residuals are only first-order serially correlated (AR(1)) within 
their own cross-sectional unit.  One solution, proposed by Beck and Katz (1996), includes 
a lagged dependent variable to account for autocorrelation.  As described above, the 
coefficient was marginally significant and the results remain the same.  Another remedy 
employs the Prais-Winsten transformation, an instance of FGLS, to eliminate the 
autocorrelation (Greene [1993], p. 663).  Let irˆ  be a consistent estimate of the 
autocorrelation parameter ri for cross-sectional unit i.  Using the above notation for the 
data, define 
 yit*  =  yit – irˆ yit -1    if t ³ 2    (3.14) 
 yi1*  = ( )2ˆ1 ir-  yi1   t = 1    (3.15) 
 
for each yi and apply the same transformation to xi for each i.  Equation (3.14) preserves 
the first data point.  We can then apply OLS with PCSEs to the transformed data in order 
to account for cross-correlation among the errors.  So the estimation procedure first 
obtains a consistent estimate of the autocorrelation parameter, applies the Prais-Winsten 
transformation to the data, and then estimates the model by OLS with PCSEs.  Beck and 
Katz (1995) counsel against allowing individual autocorrelation parameters for each 
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cross-sectional regression and suggest restricting the autocorrelation parameter ri to be 
constant across regressions.  These authors see no reason to let the nuisance 
autocorrelation parameter vary across regressions when the parameters of interest are 
pooled.  Following this advice, the mean of the individual estimated autocorrelation 
parameters provides a consistent estimate of the common restricted autocorrelation.  The 
initial estimate irˆ  of the autocorrelation parameter ri of each individual cross-sectional 
unit can be any consistent estimator, so for each cross-sectional unit we use the estimate 
obtained by an autoregression on the OLS residuals. 
A correction for autocorrelation leaves the results unchanged.  The estimated 
autocorrelation coefficient rˆ was –0.01 for the 1873 data and –0.076 for the 1893 data, 
similar to the pooled coefficient from the LM test.  Because the autocorrelation was so 
small, the results were nearly identical to the regression without autocorrelation, and so 
they are not reported. 
With the appropriate model selected, we turn to the estimation results.  The results 
presented here focus on the last three weeks before the panic.  For alternate results 
incorporating the last five weeks, that for the most part preserve the qualitative results 
discussed here, see Appendix 3A.  The magnitudes of the regression coefficients admit a 
seasonal explanation in 1873 and refute the seasonal hypothesis in 1893.  Table 3.3 
presents OLS estimation with PCSEs of (3.2), where the lagged dependent variable and 
the individual fixed effects are dropped.  The very low R-squared is expected due to the 
lack of explanatory variables.  First, consider the evidence from the panic of 1873.  The 
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interest-paying banks clearly suffered a strong reserve drain in the last three weeks of 
about 5% per week, with the drain in the last week equal to qT = 5.9%.  However, the 
non-interest-paying banks also sustained withdrawals, as their total net deposits declined 
about 2% per week in the last three weeks, with a drain in the last week equal to lT = 
3.0%.   So it appears plausible that the interest-paying banks suffered larger drains than 
the non-interest-paying banks in 1873, supporting the seasonal hypothesis.  In contrast, 
the 1893 results show that the interest-paying banks suffered much less of a shock than 
the non-interest-paying banks.  From Table 3.3, the deposits of the non-interest-paying 
banks declined about lT = 3.8% the week before the panic, while the interest-paying 
banks suffered a much smaller decline of about qT = 1.1%.  No class of banks reports 
sizable drains larger than 2% before the last week.  So on the eve of the panic of 1893, 
interest-paying banks did not suffer a sizable shock, and they suffered less of a shock to 
reserves than non-interest-paying banks.  The direction of the effect renders a seasonal 
explanation for this panic unlikely. 
The first test of the seasonal hypothesis test reveals that the interest paying banks 
suffered a statistically significant reserve drain in 1873 while the non-interest-paying 
banks did not. One test of the existence of a drain performs an ordinary t test on the qt 
coefficients with the null hypothesis that the coefficient is zero.  Table 3.3 reports 
coefficients estimated from (3.2), the usual indicator variable form of the test.  For times t 
= 89, 90, and 91, the t test shows that the interest-paying banks did suffer significant 
drains (p = 0.07, 0.06, and 0.01, respectively).  A Wald test of the joint null hypothesis 
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that the three qt coefficients are insignificant (qT-2 = qT-1 = qT = 0) is also rejected (p < 
0.01).  In contrast, the non-interest-paying banks do not appear to have suffered a 
statistically significant drain, despite losing nearly 3% a week in deposits.  The t test for 
the lt coefficients for times t = 89, 90, and 91 are insignificant (p = 0.29, 0.66, and 0.20, 
respectively), and naturally the joint Wald test of the insignificance of the three 
coefficients is also accepted (p = 0.40).  So, it appears that a seasonal drain on interest-
paying banks is a plausible explanation for the panic of 1873. 
Rather than testing for the existence of reserve drains directly, the second test 
compares the two classes of banks.  Paradoxically, while earlier evidence for 1873 
showed that the interest-paying banks suffered a drain while other banks did not, this test 
shows no significant difference between the reserve drains of the two classes of banks.  
The test of the hypothesis that the interest-paying banks suffered the same reserve shocks 
as non-interest-paying banks is given by a test of the significance of the dt coefficients in 
(3.5).  Table 3.4 presents direct t test estimates of (3.5) estimated by OLS with PCSEs.  
For the 1873 panic, the data do not reject the hypothesis of a seasonal drain despite the 
large magnitude in differences of the reserve drains.  The t tests on the coefficients dt for t 
= 89, 90, and 91 accepts the null hypothesis of equal drains (p = 0.51, 0.19, and 0.18, 
respectively).  The joint hypothesis that all three are insignificant is also accepted (p = 
0.30).  So we cannot reject equality of the two coefficients.  Most likely, this is a power 
problem.  The standard errors for the delta parameters were about 2.4%, so a difference 
of on the order of 3% will probably not be significant unless the parameters are very 
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highly correlated.  So according to the first test there is some evidence that the data admit 
a seasonal explanation, although the second test accepts the hypothesis that the two 
classes of banks suffer equal drains. 
 In contrast, the panic of 1893 produces the opposite conclusion, with non-interest-
paying banks suffering a reserve drain in the last week while interest-paying banks were 
unaffected.  Table 3.3 also reports the results for estimation of (3.2) from 1893.  For 
times t = 74, 75, and 76, the interest-paying banks clearly did not experience a 
statistically significant reserve drain (p = 0.72, 0.97, and 0.49, respectively).  Of course 
the joint test of (qT-2 = qT-1 = qT = 0) is also insignificant (p = 0.90).  But the non-interest-
paying banks clearly suffered a reserve drain in the last week before the panic.  The data 
reject the null hypothesis that lT = 0 (p = 0.01), but accept the null for t = T-1 (p = 0.20) 
and T-2 (p = 0.81).  A Wald test that the three coefficients are jointly insignificant is 
rejected due to the drain in the last week (p = 0.04).  In this case, the interest-paying 
banks did not suffer reserve drains before the panic.  Not surprisingly given the month the 
drain started, the panic of 1893 rejects the seasonal interpretation of the theory of 
Diamond and Dybvig. 
The comparison test of the two classes of banks using (3.5) does not reject the 
hypothesis that the reserve drains experienced by the two classes of banks are 
approximately the same for 1893.  From Table 4, the t tests on the coefficients dt for t = 
74, 75, and 76 accepts the null of equal drains (p = 0.92, 0.29, and 0.11, respectively), 
although the coefficient dT almost marginally rejects the null hypothesis in the wrong 
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direction.  Naturally the joint null hypothesis is accepted as well (p = 0.30).  So this test 
upholds the null hypothesis that the two banks suffered identical shocks before the 
panics.  The results of the second test appear to contradict the results of the first test, 
which stated that non-interest-paying banks did suffer a drain in the last period while 
interest-paying banks did not.  But clearly, the interest-paying banks do not suffer large 
reserve drains.  If anything, interest-paying banks suffered less of a drain then non-
interest-paying banks as the sign of both dT and dT-1 coefficients are positive.  The 
evidence shows that interest-paying banks did not suffer an unusual drain before the 
panic of 1893.  We reject seasonal drains as a trigger for the panic of 1893.  However, 
because of the significant drain on the non-interest-paying banks in the last week, the 
data allow that an exogenous drain could have struck the non-interest-paying banks.  The 
drain on the non-interest-paying banks simply reverses a small previous increase in the 
series.  The theory of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) could apply if the theory was 
reinterpreted to explain a drain on non-interest-paying banks.   
Summing up, the first test shows that in 1873 the interest-paying banks suffered a 
large reserve drain, so the data may admit a seasonal explanation.  In 1893, if any banks 
suffered a reserve drain it was the non-interest-paying banks, not the interest-paying 
banks.  We can reject Calomiris and Gorton's seasonal interpretation of the theory of 
bank runs by Diamond and Dybvig for the panic of 1893. 
 A final comment investigates the sequential effect of the panic of 1873 upon the 
panic of 1893.  Suppose that market participants use the experience of 1873 to forecast 
withdrawals during the panic of 1893.  To examine this possibility, fit the 1893 data with 
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OLS estimates of the 1873 coefficients and generate the resulting error terms.  Naturally, 
the resulting error terms are often positive, because a large drain took place in 1873 but 
not in 1893.  Approximately 12 of the 13 interest-paying banks had positive errors in 
each of the last three periods.  As for the non-interest-paying banks, approximately 36 of 
the 50 non-interest-paying banks had positive errors in each of the last three periods.  
This information does not constitute a formal test, as the errors are correlated across 
banks.  But the exercise suggests one of two scenarios.  Perhaps investors, based on their 
experience of 1873, expected a large decline in reserves that did not occur in 1893.  In 
this case the expectation of a bank panic occurring before the data ends was incorrect.  
Alternatively, the panic had not yet begun and the wise preemptive action of the New 
York Clearing House that marks the end of the data set was an attempt to prevent the 
panic before it could start. 
 
 Conclusion 
 Chapter 3 conducts an econometric test of Calomiris and Gorton's (1991) 
interpretation of the theory of Diamond and Dybvig (1983).  Diamond and Dybvig use an 
exogenous liquidity shock to depositors in order to develop a theory of bank runs.  
Calomiris and Gorton interpret the liquidity shocks as seasonal withdrawals from money-
center banks.  Calomiris and Gorton present evidence from the National Bank Era (1863–
1912) against the seasonal interpretation, even though they never econometrically test 
their claims.  This chapter employs individual level data on New York Clearing House 
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member banks to develop an econometric test of the seasonal hypothesis.  The test 
focuses on the interest-paying banks, the class of banks that based their business on 
demand deposits from interior banks, during the two panics of 1873 and 1893. 
Although the results do not reject a seasonal explanation of the panic of 1873, 
they do reject the hypothesis that withdrawals on New York by interior banks sparked the 
panic of 1893.  In 1873, interest-paying banks did suffer a reserve drain before the panic.  
But the existence of a reserve drain does not prove that it was motivated by exogenous 
agricultural needs.  In contrast, in 1893 the data reject the seasonal interpretation.  
Interest-paying banks were not responsible for the start of the panic in 1893.  Only the 
non-interest-paying banks suffer a significant reserve drain just before the data ends.  
Diamond and Dybvig's model cannot be applied to the bank panic of 1893 without a non-
seasonal interpretation of the exogenous liquidity shock. 
 An alternate explanation for the panics allows for endogenous reserve drains 
based on the strategic calculations of depositors.  Calomiris and Gorton and other authors 
focus on the role of asymmetric information about asset prices.  Models of strategic 
depositor withdrawal such as Goldstein and Pauzner (2002) and Rochet and Vives (2001) 
formalize the effect of private information about bank assets.  Another paper tests this 
hypothesis by investigating the influence of stock market prices on depositors' decisions 
before the panic of 1893 (Hoag [2002a]). 
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Appendix 3A 
 
 Appendix 3A details the sources and composition of the data.  The New York 
Clearing House archive contains the weekly statements of the Clearing House banks for 
1892–3.  Also present are the reports of the Comptroller of the Currency for national and 
state banks of the city for 1872 and 1892.   The New York Tribune carries the weekly 
bank statement for 1872–3, and this report was corrected by the same report printed in the 
Commercial and Financial Chronicle.  Unfortunately the Tribune is rather hard to read.  
Neither data set is free from error, although the 1893 data is much more accurate. 
Clearing House membership fluctuates during the dataset.  The New York 
Clearing House does not include all of the banks in New York.  A few small national 
banks and about half of the state banks were not members.  The larger and older banks, 
whether state or national, were members of the New York Clearing House.  Moen and 
Tallman (2000) suggest that selecting into a clearing house in 1907 did not have large 
impact on bank observables.  In March 1893, one bank opened for business and joined 
the Clearing House.  Two banks left the Clearing House during the period covered by the 
1873 data.  The first bank failed as a result of defalcation of a teller in May 1873, which 
was largely unrelated to the panic.  The failure of the second bank is more serious, as it 
failed during the last week of the data set.  This failure appears to be due to the panic 
conditions.  The bank suffered a small run the week of the crisis.  The bank was owed 
money by a broker who suspended, so the bank discontinued payment, and the 
Comptroller of the Currency initiated bankruptcy proceedings.  If the bank had waited to 
suspend, the bank probably would have obtained aid from the Clearing House and stood 
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with the other members.  The bank was eventually liquidated with no loss to depositors.  
The receiver's report printed in the New York Tribune on October 7, 1873 provides the 
last week of data for this bank.  While it might be possible to adjust this point to reflect 
the weekly average rather than the point estimate of the day the bank failed, small 
changes in the data point do not affect the results.  This last bank, with a full time series 
of data, was the only bank of the three included in the data set.  None of these banks were 
interest-paying banks.  After dropping one bank from each panel, we are left with 60 
banks in 1872–3 and 63 banks in 1892–3. 
The weekly statements only record net deposits, which could affect the power of 
the test.  The variable net deposits subtracts out a variety of liquid assets from gross 
deposits.  If banks sold certain assets, such as claims on other banks or bank notes of 
other banks, then net deposits would remain unchanged even though the bank made 
payments to the interior with the proceeds of these assets.  However, interest-paying 
banks did not hold substantial deposits on other banks.  Deposits on other banks formed 
only about 13% of deposits due to other banks for interest-paying banks, compared to 
38% for the non-interest-paying banks in both years.  Interior banker's deposits on 
interest-paying banks were largely unidirectional, with interior banks depositing in New 
York. 
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Appendix 3B 
 
Appendix 3B describes the results of two variations of the tests.  The first 
variation includes five weeks of time shocks before the panics instead of three.  Adding 
two additional weeks only changed the result of one hypothesis test.  The second 
variation tests the null hypothesis of the first test against q0 or l0 instead of against zero.  
For example, one hypothesis of interest becomes H0: qt = q0.  Recall that in the regression 
in Table 3.3, q0 measures the time mean of the shocks qt of the periods without a specific 
time dummy variable.  From Table 3.3, note that the coefficient l0 is very close to zero in 
both 1872–3 and 1892–3, while for q0 there is a slight upward trend in 1872–3 and a 
slight downward trend in 1892–3, although all four coefficients are statistically 
insignificant.  As a consequence, the results remain the same as when the hypotheses are 
tested against zero. 
Tables 3.3a and 3.4a are the analogue of Tables 3.3 and 3.4 using five weeks 
instead of three weeks in the estimation of the restricted version of (3.2), using only time 
indicator variables on the RHS.  The only interesting feature of allowing extra weeks is 
that in 1893, the interest-paying banks suffered a 3% reserve drain in the fifth week 
before the panic began.  One might associate the withdrawal with the large decline in 
securities prices on the New York Stock Exchange (Sprague, p. 167) that occurred in 
early May, 1893.  Tables 3.5 and 3.6 present the results of hypothesis tests of the form 
H0: qt = 0 and H0: qt = q0.  Only in two cases does the significance level of the individual 
coefficients change marginally. 
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Tables 3.7 and 3.8 display the results of the tests for joint significance.  The only 
case where significance changed was when the two classes of banks were compared over 
five weeks instead of three weeks in 1893.  With five weeks, the Wald test judges that the 
two classes of banks suffered statistically significantly different drains (p < 0.01), while 
with three weeks the test could not reject identical shocks to the two classes of banks (p = 
0.30).  This reversal resolves the apparent contradiction with the evidence from test 1 that 
the non-interest-paying banks suffered a drain while the interest-paying banks did not.  
Even though a shock does strike the interest-paying banks during the fifth week before 
the panic, the interest-paying banks still did not suffer a large drain in 1893 (H0: qT-4 = ... 
= qT, p = 0.43). 
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Appendix 3C 
 
 Appendix 3C describes two details of the application of the Chang (2002) SN 
panel unit root test.  The two details treated here are the choice of whether or not to 
include a time trend and the selection of the lag truncation procedure. 
The version of the test employed here corrects for a positive mean but does not 
adjust for a time trend.  Because Chang corrects for a nonzero mean in the Monte Carlo 
size and power study, it seems wise to do the same.  Chang uses adaptive demeaning to 
remove the mean from the series.  The series is transformed by subtracting the mean of 
the previous t data points.  If qit is the original series, then the adaptively demeaned series 
yit is: 
yit  =  qit  – å
-
=
1
1
t
j
jtq         (3.16) 
A time trend in the unit root test seems unwarranted in this context.  The data do appear 
to be downward trending over the sample period.   However, the decline observed in total 
net deposits during the sample period is short-term, as the level of deposits sharply 
increases back to higher levels after the panic (see Figures 3.1 and 3.2).   Since the time 
trend does not persist outside the sample, it seems spurious to include it in the model.  
Hence, the method of choice is the adaptive demeaned test. 
The SN test is somewhat sensitive to lag order pi of the autoregressions.  The 
version of the test in the text fixed the number of lags at four for all cross-sectional units 
i.  Autoregressions of order one (pi = 1 for all i) preserved the results with SN statistics of 
–11.38 in 1873 and –4.46 in 1893.  While it might be possible to adopt more 
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sophisticated lag truncation rules, in this case the test results are robust to two different 
lag structures so additional modification seems superfluous. 
108
Figure 3.1: Total Net Deposits of
 New York Clearing House Member Banks, 1872-3
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Figure 3.2: Total Net Deposits of
 New York Clearing House Member Banks, 1892-3
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Figure 3.3: Total Net Deposits of Interest-paying Banks, 1872-3
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Figure 3.4: Total Net Deposits of Non-interest-paying Banks, 1872-3
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Figure 3.5: Total Net Deposits of Interest-paying Banks, 1892-3
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Figure 3.6: Total Net Deposits of Non-interest-paying Banks, 1892-3
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Table 3.1:  Comparison of estimation procedures for 1873 data 
 (approximate t statistics in parentheses, individual fixed effects not reported) 
     
 Variable  OLS   FGLS   PCSEs   
 g:   -0.067   -0.114   -0.067 
    (-4.91)   (-8.28)   (-1.88) 
 
 l0:   0.219   0.196   0.219 
    (0.24)   (0.50)   (0.55) 
 
 lT-2:   -2.443   -1.812   -2.443 
  (-1.66)   (-3.14)   (-1.03) 
 
 lT-1:   -0.982   0.019   -0.982 
    (-0.67)   (0.03)   (-0.41)   
 
 lT:   -2.845   -1.705   -2.845  
    (-1.93)   (-2.95)   (-1.20)  
 
 q0:   0.262   0.204   0.262  
  
    (0.29)   (0.88)   (1.12)  
  
 qT-2:   -4.139   -2.565   -4.139 
    (-1.41)   (-2.93)   (-1.81) 
 
qT-1:   -4.462   -2.079   -4.462 
   (-1.52)   (-2.37)   (-1.95) 
 
qT:   -6.205   -4.509   -6.205  
   (-2.12)   (-5.15)   (-2.71) 
  
R2:   0.010   -  0.010 (from OLS)  
 Log Likelihood: -   -13870   -   
 
Number of Observations: 89 weeks * 60 banks = 5340 
Dependent variable: 
yit  =   å
Î
-
--
iCj
jti
itit
TNDC
TNDTND
1
1
)/1(
)(100       (3.3) 
Model:  yit  =   µ + a i + g yit-1 +  q0 (IP it) + l0 (NIPit )  + e it. t < T-2  (3.2) 
yit  =   µ + a i + g yit-1 +  qt (IP it) + lt (NIPit )  + eit t = T-2, T-1, or T 
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Table 3.2:  Comparison of estimation procedures for 1893 data 
 (approximate t statistics in parentheses, individual fixed effects not reported) 
     
 Variable  OLS   FGLS   PCSEs   
 g:   0.025   -0.015   0.025 
    (1.73)   (-1.11)   (0.62) 
 
 l0:   0.155   0.150   0.155 
    (0.23)   (0.65)   (0.66) 
 
 lT-2:   -0.232   -0.150   -0.232 
    (-0.22)   (-0.46)   (-0.16) 
 
 lT-1:   -1.705   -1.435   -1.705 
    (-1.59)   (-4.44)   (-1.21)   
 
 lT:   -3.585   -3.246   -3.585  
    (-3.34)   (-10.01)  (-2.55)  
 
 q0:   -0.682   -0.714   -0.682   
    (-0.99)   (-1.22)   (-1.16)  
  
 
 qT-2:   -0.937   -0.985   -0.937 
    (-0.53)   (-1.53)   (-0.58) 
 
qT-1:   -0.446   -0.091   -0.446  
   (-0.25)   (-0.14)   (-0.27) 
 
qT:   -1.468   -1.330   -1.468 
    (-0.83)   (-2.07)   (-0.90) 
  
R2:   0.011   -  0.011 (from OLS)  
 Log Likelihood: -   -9268   -  
  
Number of Observations: 74 weeks * 63 banks = 4662 
Dependent variable: 
yit  =   å
Î
-
--
iCj
jti
itit
TNDC
TNDTND
1
1
)/1(
)(100       (3.3) 
Model:  yit  =   µ + a i + g yit-1 +  q0 (IP it) + l0 (NIPit )  + e it. t < T-2  (3.2) 
yit  =   µ + a i + g yit-1 +  qt (IP it) + lt (NIPit )  + eit t = T-2, T-1, T 
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Table 3.3:  Ordinary Wald test form of regression: restricted PCSE estimation 
 (approximate t statistics in parentheses) 
        
 Variable   1873   1893  
 
 l0:    0.0465   0.035 
     (0.19)   (0.20) 
 
 lT-2:    -2.412   -0.360 
     (-1.05)   (-0.24) 
 
 lT-1:    -1.017   -1.886 
     (-0.44)    (-1.28) 
 
 lT:    -2.973   -3.805 
     (-1.29)   (-2.58)  
 
 q0:    0.244   -0.270  
     (1.03)   (-1.50) 
 
 qT-2:    -4.022   -0.544 
     (-1.81)   (-0.36) 
 
qT-1:    -4.208   -0.050 
    (-1.90)   (-0.03) 
 
qT:    -5.938   -1.060 
     (-2.68)   (-0.69) 
 
R2 (from OLS):  0.0039   0.0060 
Observations:   5400   4725  
 
 
Dependent variable: 
 
yit  =   å
Î
-
--
iCj
jti
itit
TNDC
TNDTND
1
1
)/1(
)(100       (3.3) 
 
Model:  yit  =   q0 (IP it) + l0 (NIP it )  + eit. t < T-2   (3.2 restricted) 
yit  =   qt (IP it) + lt (NIPit )  + eit  t = T-2, T-1, T  
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Table 3.3a:  Ordinary Wald test form of regression: restricted PCSE estimation 
with 5 weeks (approximate t statistics in parentheses) 
        
 Variable   1873   1893  
 
 l0:    0.113   -0.019 
     (0.46)   (-0.11) 
 
 lT-4:    -2.180   2.109 
     (-0.97)   (1.46) 
 
 lT-3:    -3.383   1.721 
     (-1.50)    (1.19) 
 
 lT-2:    -2.412   -0.360 
     (-1.07)   (-0.25) 
 
 lT-1:    -1.017   -1.886 
     (-0.45)    (-1.31) 
 
 lT:    -2.973   -3.805 
     (-1.32)   (-2.64)  
 
 q0:    0.316   -0.226  
     (1.34)   (-1.26) 
 
 qT-4:    -3.597   -3.012 
     (-1.66)   (-2.01) 
 
qT-3:    -1.985   -0.668 
    (-0.92)   (-0.45) 
 
 qT-2:    -4.022   -0.544 
     (-1.86)   (-0.36) 
 
qT-1:    -4.208   -0.050 
    (-1.94)   (-0.03) 
 
qT:    -5.938   -1.060 
     (-2.74)   (-0.71) 
R2 (from OLS):  0.0066   0.0089 
Observations:   5400   4725  
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Table 3.4:  Direct t test form of regression: restricted PCSE estimation  
 (approximate t statistics in parentheses) 
        
 Variable   1873   1893  
 
 l0:    0.047   0.035 
     (0.19)   (0.20) 
 
 lT-2:    -2.412   -0.360 
     (-1.05)   (-0.24) 
 
 lT-1:    -1.017   -1.886 
     (-0.44)    (-1.28) 
 
 lT:    -2.973   -3.805 
     (-1.29)   (-2.58)  
 
 d0:    0.198   -0.305  
     (0.76)   (-1.50)  
 
 dT-2:    -1.609   -0.184 
     (-0.67)   (-0.11) 
 
dT-1:    -3.191   1.836 
    (-1.32)   (1.06) 
 
dT:    -2.965   2.745 
     (-1.23)   (1.58) 
 
R2 (from OLS):  0.0039   0.0060  
Observations:   5400   4725 
 
Dependent variable: 
 
yit  =   å
Î
-
--
iCj
jti
itit
TNDC
TNDTND
1
1
)/1(
)(100      (3.3) 
 
Model:  yit  =   l0 (IPt + NIPt)  + dt (IPt) + eit t < T-2   (3.5 restricted) 
yit  =   lt (IPt + NIPt)  + dt (IPt) + eit t = T-2, T-1, T 
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Table 3.4a:  Direct t test form of regression: restricted PCSE estimation  
with 5 weeks (approximate t statistics in parentheses) 
        
 Variable   1873   1893  
 
 l0:    0.113   -0.019 
     (0.46)   (-0.11) 
 
 lT-4:    -2.180   2.109 
     (-0.97)   (1.46) 
 
 lT-3:    -3.383   1.721 
     (-1.50)    (1.19) 
 
 lT-2:    -2.412   -0.360 
     (-1.07)   (-0.25) 
 
 lT-1:    -1.017   -1.886 
     (-0.45)    (-1.31) 
 
 lT:    -2.973   -3.805 
     (-1.32)   (-2.64)  
 
 d0:    0.203   -0.207 
     (0.78)   (-1.07)  
 
 dT-4:    -1.418   -5.121 
     (-0.59)   (-3.16) 
 
dT-3:    1.398   -2.389 
    (0.58)   (-1.47) 
 
 dT-2:    -1.609   -0.184 
     (-0.67)   (-0.11) 
 
dT-1:    -3.191   1.836 
    (-1.33)   (1.13) 
 
dT:    -2.965   2.745 
     (-1.23)   (1.69) 
R2 (from OLS):  0.0066   0.0089  
Observations:   5400   4725 
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Table 3.5:  Modified first test in 1873 
 
l0 = 0.113 with s.e. 0.245 
 
q0 = 0.316 with s.e. 0.235 
 
 
  H0:  (lt = 0) (lt = l0) 
  lT-4  -2.179 
    (0.334)  (0.312) 
 
  lT-3  -3.383 
    (0.134)  (0.123) 
 
  lT-2  -2.413 
    (0.285)  (0.266) 
 
  lT-1  -1.017 
    (0.652)  (0.617) 
 
  lT  -2.973 
   (0.187)  (0.174) 
 
 
 
  H0:  (qt = 0) (qt = q0)      
 qT-4  -3.597   
    (0.097)  (0.072) 
 
 qT-3  -1.985 
    (0.359)  (0.291) 
 
qT-2  -4.022 
    (0.063)  (0.047) 
 
qT-1  -4.208 
    (0.052)  (0.038) 
 
qT  -5.938 
    (0.006)  (0.004) 
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Table 3.6: Modified first test in 1893 
 
l0 = -0.019 with s.e. 0.172 
 
q0 = -0.226 with s.e. 0.179 
 
 
  H0:  (lt = 0) (lt = l0) 
  lT-4  2.109 
    (0.143)  (0.143) 
 
  lT-3  1.721 
    (0.232)  (0.230) 
 
  lT-2  -0.360 
    (0.803)  (0.814) 
 
  lT-1  -1.886 
    (0.190)  (0.198) 
 
  lT  -3.805 
   (0.008)  (0.009) 
 
 
 
  H0:  (qt = 0) (qt = q0)      
 qT-4  -3.012   
    (0.044)  (0.065) 
 
 qT-3  -0.668 
    (0.656)  (0.769) 
 
qT-2  -0.544 
    (0.716)  (0.833) 
 
qT-1  -0.500 
    (0.973)  (0.907) 
 
qT  -1.060 
    (0.479)  (0.580) 
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 Table 3.7: Joint tests and modified joint tests in 1873 
 
 
Joint Tests: 
 
H0: (qT-k = ... = qT-1 = qT = 0)  =  no drain on IP banks 
 IP banks   3 weeks  5 weeks 
 F test (p value)  < 0.01   < 0.01 
 
 
H0: (lT-k = ...= lT-1 = lT = 0)  =  no drain on NIP banks 
 NIP banks   3 weeks  5 weeks 
 F test (p value)  0.40   0.28 
 
H0: (dT-k = ... = dT-1 = dT = 0) = no difference between two classes 
Difference   3 weeks  5 weeks 
 F test (p value)  0.30   0.49 
 
 
 
Modified joint tests: 
 
H0: (qT-k = ... = qT-1 = qT = q0)  =  no drain different from mean on IP banks 
 IP banks   3 weeks  5 weeks 
 F test (p value)  < 0.01   < 0.01 
 
H0: (lT-k = ...= lT-1 = lT = l0)  =  no drain different from mean on NIP banks 
 NIP banks   3 weeks  5 weeks 
 F test (p value)  0.39   0.26 
 
  
123
 
Table 3.8: Joint tests and modified joint tests in 1893 
 
 
Joint Tests: 
 
H0: (qT-k = ... = qT-1 = qT = 0)  =  no drain on IP banks 
 IP banks   3 weeks  5 weeks 
 F test (p value)  0.90   0.43 
 
H0: (lT-k = ...= lT-1 = lT = 0)  =  no drain on NIP banks 
 NIP banks   3 weeks  5 weeks 
 F test (p value)  0.04   0.03 
 
H0: (dT-k = ... = dT-1 = dT = 0) = no difference between two classes  
Difference   3 weeks  5 weeks 
 F test (p value)  0.30   < 0.01 
 
 
Modified joint tests in 1893: 
 
H0: (qT-k = ... = qT-1 = qT = q0)  =  no drain different from mean on IP banks 
 IP banks   3 weeks  5 weeks 
 F test (p value)  0.96   0.58 
 
H0: (lT-k = ...= lT-1 = lT = l0)  =  no drain different from mean on NIP banks 
 NIP banks   3 weeks  5 weeks 
 F test (p value)  0.04   0.03 
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